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I. INTRODUCTION
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once railed against the 
United States’ addiction to foreign oil: “We have to 
do something about the energy problem. I can tell 
you that nothing has really taken me aback more… 
than the way that the politics of energy is… ‘warping’ 
diplomacy around the world.”1 Such statements are 
nothing new. Indeed, every president since Richard 
Nixon has labeled America’s overreliance on foreign 
oil as a strategic liability and promised to put 
America on the path towards energy independence. 
Unfortunately, the history of presidential energy 
security policy is riddled with failure. Despite several 
presidential initiatives, American imports of crude 
oil rose steadily from 1.93 billion barrels in 1970 to a 
peak of 3.69 billion in 2005.2 A 2011 CBS News story 
summarized the trend with the damning headline: 
“Fuelish Dreams: Every President Tries to Break U.S. 
Oil Addiction; Every President Fails.”3
Today, however, the headlines read differently. 
The United States is in the midst of a “Shale 
Revolution” in which domestic sources of shale 
oil and natural gas are rapidly transforming the 
nation’s energy outlook. Soaring U.S. shale oil and 
gas production is sharply curbing U.S.’s net energy 
exports to the point that America will be a net energy 
exporter by 2050. Suddenly, the U.S.’s energy security 
seems to be on rather sound footing.
While the Shale Revolution has already begun 
to reshape the energy landscape, its geopolitical 
consequences are still unclear. A key area of interest 
is determining what impact the Shale Revolution 
will have on the United States’ strategy and military 
posture in the Persian Gulf, an area produces 30 
percent of the world’s crude oil.4 Indeed, as Barry 
Posen notes, the United States has long protected the 
flow of oil in the Persian Gulf with “a full panoply 
of air, sea, and land forces, a goal that consumes at 
least 15 percent of the U.S. defense budget.”5 To some 
supporters like Admiral Dennis Blair and General 
Michael Hagee, the Shale Revolution provides the 
United States the strategic flexibility to significantly 
reshape and reduce its footprint in the Middle East.6
This paper examines that broad proposition 
with a critical lens. Our research question is 
simple: How will the Shale Revolution affect U.S. 
strategy towards the Middle East, specifically in the 
Persian Gulf? We first examine whether increased 
production from the Shale Revolution will continue 
and arrive at the conclusion that it will endure. 
Next, we review the history of U.S. involvement in 
the Middle East since 1971, a story of threats and 
responses that gradually deepened U.S. commitments 
in the region. This history reveals a multiplicity 
of interests that motivates U.S. engagement. Next, 
we turn to a comparative study that draws lessons 
from Britain’s experiences with energy revolutions. 
Our comparative study of the British experience 
demonstrates that hegemonic powers retain a broad 
array of interests that are worth securing with global 
forces. We show that Britain acted as a balancing 
power in the Middle East and secured oil resources to 
hedge against the rise of a regional rival. We contend 
the United States must do the same today.
Our study of the past points to a clear policy 
recommendation: continued engagement in the 
Middle East. For a public that wants to disengage 
from the region, this proposal may be unsatisfying. 
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Though the Shale Revolution promises an era of 
domestic energy abundance, it will not upend 
U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Both its 
energy and its non-energy interests will endure well 
into the future. Moreover, U.S. allies will continue 
to depend on Persian Gulf oil supplies, and the 
United States has an interest in their economic well-
being. Lastly, related interests such as preventing 
the rise of a hostile hegemon like China, protecting 
regional partners like Saudi Arabia, and countering 
unconventional threats like terrorism will persist in 
the Middle East even if the United States becomes a 
net energy exporter.
II. WHAT IS THE SHALE REVOLUTION? – A NEW 
AGE OF ENERGY ABUNDANCE
[I]t now looks as though the first few 
decades of the twenty-first century will see 
an extension of the trend that has persisted 
for the past few millennia: the availability of 
plentiful energy at ever-lower cost and with 
greater efficiency, enabling major advances 
in global economic growth.7
— Edward Morse, Citigroup commodity 
research director
Only five years ago, the United States 
confronted what seemed to be a depressing future 
dominated by peaking global oil supplies, falling 
conventional production, and rising imports of 
foreign oil and natural gas.8 The U.S.’s energy outlook 
was grim. However, those predictions proved to be 
“spectacularly wrong.”9 The United States is now in 
the midst of a “Shale Revolution” in which domestic 
sources of shale oil and natural gas promise decades 
of energy abundance. Instead of peak oil production, 
analysts now forecast increasing rates of global 
production.10 U.S. oil and natural gas production 
has skyrocketed since 2009, and the nation’s imports 
of foreign oil are rapidly decreasing. As of 2014, 
the United States imported 44 percent of crude oil 
from other countries. Of the 44 percent imported, 
25 percent came from the Persian Gulf.11 However, 
analysts now expect the United States to surpass 
Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer by 
2015 and become a net oil exporter by 2030.12 
The Shale Revolution represents a massive shift 
in the U.S. energy outlook. Two factors catalyzed the 
revolution. First, new drilling techniques including 
hydraulic fracturing (or “fracking”) and horizontal 
drilling allow American companies to extract natural 
gas and “tight” crude oil from shale rock formations 
across the country. Until recently, extracting these 
unconventional energy resources was not considered 
economically viable.13 New drilling techniques made 
recovery of those reserves feasible. Recent estimates 
now put the quantity of technically recoverable North 
American shale gas at 1,930 tcf—roughly fifty times 
greater than estimates in 2003.14 Proven U.S. crude 
oil reserves increased for the “fifth year in a row in 
2013, and exceeded 36 billion barrels for the first 
time since 1975.”15 Tight oil discoveries in North 
Dakota and Texas accounted for 90 percent of that 
increase.16 
The combination of high oil prices and falling 
operational costs created a favorable environment 
for unconventional drilling. With oil prices hovering 
above $100 per barrel for much of the past decade, 
energy companies were willing to make large up-
front investments in shale drilling technology. 
The prospect of high profit margins, supported 
by relatively high crude oil and gas prices, drew 
thousands of drillers into the industry. Thus, 
while improvements in drilling techniques made 
production of shale gas technologically feasible, 
underlying economic conditions made the United 
States’ Shale Revolution possible. 
1. Will the Shale Revolution Continue?
The Shale Revolution has produced dramatic 
gains in domestic production of oil and natural gas. 
However, skeptics caution that these gains might be 
short-lived. In particular, they point to two potential 
pitfalls: declining production rates and unfavorable 
drilling economics. We argue that each of these 
concerns is overblown. 
Skeptics like David Hughes, a geologist and 
president of Global Sustainability Research, point 
out that fracking yields uneven production because 
wells deplete quickly.17 While the rate of depletion 
for conventional oil wells averages around 5 percent 
per year, some shale oil wells deplete at a much faster 
rate—44 percent per year, for example, in the Bakken 
shale plays of North Dakota.18 Higher well depletion 
rates could indicate that production gains are illusory. 
Just because a shale well spurts out a significant 
supply of oil today does not mean it will continue 
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to do so in the near future. Recent technological 
innovations, however, are changing this pattern. 
New seismic technologies have enabled drillers to 
find and tap wells with slower depletion rates and 
long tails of production. According to veteran oil 
analyst Ed Morse, there are now a sufficient number 
of these wells to ensure that the flows will continue 
over time.19 At the very least, these high-quality wells 
virtually eliminate the possibility of a sudden plunge 
in shale oil and gas production. 
Skeptics also assert that falling global oil prices 
could upend many shale companies that operate on 
razor-thin margins. The Economist notes that most 
major companies “assume an oil price of $80 when 
making plans.”20 Bernstein Research concurs, but 
also notes that a third of U.S. shale oil production 
is uneconomical at that price.21The recent plunge 
in oil prices, which bottomed out at $44 in January 
2015, has already had this effect.22 Industry analysts 
at Baker Hughes note that the number of U.S. oil 
rigs dropped 24 percent from the all-time high in 
October 2014.23 This, the skeptics contend, presages a 
drop in U.S. shale oil production.24
A drop in oil prices may pinch producers, but 
it does not spell the end of the Shale Revolution. 
Traders already expect the price of oil to rise again. 
Indeed, December 2017 Brent crude futures were 
trading above $73 in early February.25 Moreover, a 
study by energy consultancy IHS, Inc. found that 
47 percent of new U.S. oil producers could break 
even at a price below $61 per barrel. Technological 
innovation and better management practices will 
only drive this price lower through efficiency gains. 
A recent report by Accenture found that drillers 
could cut costs up to 40 percent through better 
planning, contracting, and purchasing.26 The Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) reports that the quantity 
of shale gas produced per rig has increased more 
than 300 percent over the past four years due to 
technological innovations.27 Morse points out that 
these efficiency gains are already having an impact; 
he expects them to drive break-even points to $40 
per barrel within a few years.28 In a sense, the same 
technological innovation that sparked the Shale 
Revolution helps ensure its enduring strength. 
2. Does the Shale Revolution Shift U.S. Interests?
 Our brief examination of the Shale 
Revolution indicates that it will dramatically alter 
the United States’ energy outlook. Can we expect 
a similar shift in geopolitics, particularly U.S. 
involvement in the Middle East? There are prima 
facie reasons to expect so. A United States that no 
longer relies on Persian Gulf oil would theoretically 
have the flexibility to withdraw from a region that 
has consumed American blood and treasure for 
much of the last decade. In the following sections, 
we interrogate this claim and pose a question of 
our own: how will the Shale Revolution affect U.S. 
strategy in the Middle East? Studying the history 
of U.S. strategy in the area offers a worthy point 
of departure. Thus, we seek to understand, firstly, 
the key interests that have historically driven U.S. 
engagement and, secondly, whether the need to 
secure U.S. access to oil has ever been the sole or 
overriding interest justifying American strategy in 
the region.
III. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF U.S. 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
“No Blood for Oil!”—anti-war protesters have 
employed this slogan since at least 1991, when college 
students used it to support their opposition to the 
Gulf War.29 Rutgers professor Toby C. Jones wrote in 
a 2012 article about a U.S. “obsession” with oil that 
has motivated its “militarism” in the oil-rich Arab 
states. “Having crafted a set of relationships with oil 
and unstable oil producers and having linked the fate 
of those relationships to American national security,” 
Jones asserts, “virtually ensures that while the United 
States is wrapping up the most recent oil war, its 
military and political strategists are already preparing 
for the next one.”30 Critics in academia, like Dr. 
Michael Klare in his article “Oil Wars Transforming 
the American Military into a Global Oil-Protection 
Service,” and the general public have long been 
skeptical of the motives for American involvement in 
the Middle East. 31 For example, some charged that 
the American military was being deployed solely to 
protect the nation’s oil supply.32 Unfortunately for 
slogan-chanters, the situation is much more complex. 
A history of U.S. policy in the Middle East 
since the 1970s shows that the United States has 
long expressed and defended a multitude of interests 
in the region. Secure access to oil for the United 
States, its allies, and the global economy has been a 
consistent priority, but far from the only motive for 
involvement. The enduring principles of U.S. Middle 
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East strategy also include:
1)  Prevent the rise of a hostile regional hegemon: 
Since the 1970s, the United States has increased 
its presence in the Middle East to counter the 
threat of another dominant force that could cut 
off oil supplies to the Western world. From the 
1970s to the end of the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union posed the dominant challenge. Iran and 
Iraq have similarly threatened to greatly expand 
their influence at times. 
2)  Support allies and partners in the Persian Gulf: 
The United States fundamentally values its allies’ 
security, adding Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to a 
list of partners. Supporting U.S. allies boosts 
credibility, thereby enhancing America’s role as a 
hegemonic guarantor of stability.
3)  Maintain a stabilizing presence in the region: 
The prosperity of the United States and its 
allies depends on uninterrupted trade in an 
increasingly interdependent world economy. 
Instability in the Middle East threatens the global 
economy.
4)  Counter unconventional threats: These threats 
include rogue states, terrorism, and weapons 
of mass destruction. They primarily arose after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and concerns 
intensified after September 11, 2001.
1. A History of Threats and Responses
Before 1971, the West enjoyed negotiating 
power with regional producers and could weather 
Middle Eastern oil-supply disruptions. Post-World 
War II Britain remained influential with the Gulf 
States and guaranteed the security of the small 
emirates. Yet three factors make 1971 a turning point 
in the history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East 
and a useful starting point for a “modern” history of 
U.S. goals in the region. First, the United States lost 
its twenty-year oil surplus capacity. The domestic 
combination of surging demand and falling discovery 
rates pushed U.S. companies to “all-out production” 
of its few producing wells.33 This change meant the 
end of the “security margin” of production that had 
insulated the West from disruptions and crises in the 
Middle East.34 Second, in February 1971, Western 
oil companies surrendered power to OPEC. The 
Tehran Agreement ended the fifty-fifty division of oil 
revenue that had been a “hallowed” principle for two 
decades; producer countries now had the upper hand 
in dividing revenues and setting prices. As Shell’s 
chairman said at the time, “the buyer’s market for oil 
is over.”35 Third, a regional power vacuum opened. 
Following through on Britain’s 1968 renunciation of 
its security commitments east of Suez, British forces 
withdrew from the region in November. Renowned 
energy historian Daniel Yergin writes that the 
withdrawal “marked the most fundamental change in 
the Gulf since World War II and meant the end of the 
security system that had operated in the area for over 
a century.”36 The Soviets reacted quickly and filled the 
void, sending a naval task force to the Indian Ocean 
and negotiating for permanent bases on the Gulf as 
one part of the nation’s long search for warm-water 
ports.37
After 1971, the United States faced a new era of 
economic and military volatility in the Middle East. 
Rather than sending U.S. forces to replace the British, 
President Richard M. Nixon relied on the pro-
Western Iranian Shah to keep order in the Middle 
East. Exhausted by Vietnam, the United States 
delegated security to regional “policemen” under the 
Nixon Doctrine.38 The history of U.S. involvement 
since then has been a story of threats and responses: 
threats to vital strategic interests and U.S. responses 
that deepened U.S. military involvement. 
2. The Yom Kippur War and the OPEC Embargo
The first major threat to U.S. interests came in 
1973 with the surprise Yom Kippur offensive against 
Israel. The United States’ response showed that its 
commitment to an ally mattered more than its access 
to oil. Before the Arab states invaded the Israeli-
occupied Suez Peninsula, “U.S. oil companies in the 
region [had] pressed the administration to adopt a 
less pro-Israeli position.” President Nixon refused, 
standing by the official policy of support for Israel.39 
When the Israelis appeared vulnerable to defeat at the 
hands of the Soviet-supplied Arabs, the U.S. military 
resupplied their ally, but was unable to keep the effort 
secret. Arab oil producers led OPEC to impose a total 
oil embargo within the week.40 By supporting Israel 
at the expense of the United States’ oil supply, Nixon 
showed that oil was among several interests guiding 
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
U.S. leaders responded to the economic threat 
of the embargo with limited measures. Nixon’s first 
reaction was domestic: a speech that encouraged oil 
conservation and grandiosely announced Project 
Independence, an effort “in the spirit of Apollo [and] 
with the determination of the Manhattan Project.”41 
In 1974, the United States formed the International 
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Energy Agency (IEA) with other importing nations, 
which led to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
and similar reserves in other IEA countries.42 When 
Gerald Ford became president, he also focused on 
domestic measures: fuel standards, the massive 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline, and a plan for 200 nuclear 
power plants. These responses showed that although 
the United States worried about energy security, the 
country would not take aggressive military action to 
restore Middle Eastern oil supplies or the low prices 
it enjoyed before 1971. 
3. The Origins of U.S. Central Command
In the 1970s, the United States arbitrarily 
divided the Gulf between European and Pacific 
Commands. Soon after President Jimmy Carter took 
office, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski 
ordered a broad interagency review of “how we are 
doing in the world versus the Soviet Union.” The 
review proposed a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) 
for the Gulf. In August 1977, Carter created the RDF 
by presidential directive.43
As Brzezinski’s military assistant Gen. William 
E. Odom later wrote, the impetus for the RDF was 
not securing oil supplies, but rather countering 
growing Soviet military power that threatened the 
region.44 A March 1979 Brzezinski memo to Carter 
emphasized that Soviet power in the Middle East 
was concerning because Europe and Japan depended 
heavily on its oil. Yet, actual implementation had 
barely progressed by December 1979 when the 
Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Even after that, inter-
service rivalry stymied progress.45 U.S. Central 
Command (USCENTCOM) was finally established 
in January 1983. Odom’s account shows that 
increased military focus on the Middle East was not 
driven solely or even primarily by U.S. demand for 
oil. Soviet aggression, regional instability, and allies’ 
oil interests were the major concerns.
4. Double Trouble: Iran and Afghanistan
In 1979, the United States faced threats in both 
Afghanistan and Iran. Until then, U.S. strategists 
relied on Nixon’s “Two Pillars” strategy of regional 
policemen that relied on Iran and Saudi Arabia for 
stability in the post-British power vacuum.46 The 
Iranian Revolution that year ended the strategy’s 
viability, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
worried U.S. policymakers. U.S. leaders feared that, 
“the Soviets hoped to capitalize on the American-
Iranian crisis to secure a warm-water port on the 
Indian Ocean and to gain control of Arabian Gulf 
oil resources.”47 Americans perceived the invasion 
of Afghanistan to be more threatening than previous 
Soviet interventions. “[H]aving demonstrated its 
willingness to directly employ combat troops outside 
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, as opposed to its 
normal practice of providing military aid, advisers, 
and logistical support,” one political scientist writes, 
U.S. policymakers thought, “Moscow would next 
turn its focus to the Persian Gulf.”48 The concern was 
two-fold. First, the Soviets seemed to be embarking 
on a program of aggressive expansion. Second, this 
expansion might endanger Western access to oil, 
devastating import-reliant allies.
While Carter’s rhetorical response was strong, 
it was neither politically popular nor militarily 
feasible. In his 1980 State of the Union, he declared, 
“An attempt by any outside force to gain control 
of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interests of the United States. It 
will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, 
including military force.”49 The Carter Doctrine was 
an election-year attempt to demonstrate U.S. strength 
to both the Soviets and the electorate. However, the 
doctrine was unpopular with allies and militarily 
unrealistic without forces like CENTCOM and 
the Fifth Fleet. In January 1980, the U.S. military 
lacked the ability to launch a major war in the area. 
According to Dr. Jeffery Michaels of King’s College 
London, “not only did the U.S. military not have 
hundreds of thousands of troops available to be 
rapidly deployed to the region, it also did not have 
the means of getting them there or the means of 
sustaining such a force once it arrived.”50 Although 
the Carter Doctrine may have appeared to deter 
further Soviet aggression, evidence from Soviet 
archives shows that the Politburo actually invaded 
Afghanistan with defensive intentions; Moscow had 
no plans to invade the Gulf.51 However untenable it 
was, the doctrine does reveal U.S. goals in the region. 
Rather than simply protecting the oil supply, Carter 
aimed to contain Soviet expansion and prevent a 
hostile hegemon from dominating the Gulf. These 
were two grand strategic goals beyond the flow of oil.
5. Balancing During the Reagan Administration
Mere months after his inauguration, President 
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Reagan issued a corollary to the Carter Doctrine that 
clearly identified U.S. strategy: “There is no way…
that we could stand by and see [Saudi Arabia] taken 
over by anyone that would shut off the oil.” Now, the 
United States had committed itself to not only repel 
an invasion by a foreign power—namely the Soviet 
Union—but also intra-regional threats.52 While 
Reagan’s corollary explicitly guaranteed the oil supply, 
the reasons for that guarantee are not explained as 
simply by the United States’ thirst for Middle Eastern 
oil. As Blackwill and O’Sullivan make clear, our 
allies’ economies depend more on that oil than the 
U.S. economy does.53 In addition, guaranteeing the 
flow of oil is part of the job description for the global 
hegemon; as the British ensured freedom of the seas, 
the Americans need to ensure freedom of supplies. 
Reagan made the corollary more realistic 
than Carter’s doctrine by formally consolidating 
CENTCOM. However, one contemporary critic, Dr. 
Coral Bell, charged that he largely stood by during 
the Iran-Iraq War despite threats to oil tankers from 
missiles and mines. Likely unaware of ongoing 
covert efforts, the critic wrote in 1984, “Present U.S. 
policy looks uncommonly like a tacit acquiescence 
in the Nixon Doctrine—that local powers must 
learn to fend for themselves.”54 Though the United 
States appeared to passively stand by, the Reagan 
administration covertly used the Iran-Iraq War 
by “seeking to create a balance of military power 
between these two large Gulf powers in order to 
prolong the war, weaken them, and prevent an anti-
Western local actor from dominating the region.”55 
(Those efforts to supply both sides became public, 
and notorious, during the Iran-Contra investigation.) 
The effort to play the two powers against each other 
represents an instance of the U.S. grand strategic 
pillar of halting the rise of a hostile local hegemon. 
Reagan also expanded covert aid to the Afghan 
mujahideen that Carter had initiated.56 U.S. leaders 
were taking some action to support their rhetoric, 
covertly expanding U.S. military involvement in the 
region.
The United States intervened in the Iran-Iraq 
conflict from 1987 to 1988 in an episode known as 
the Tanker War. Iraq began attacking Iranian oil 
production and shipping; according to a U.S. Navy 
historian, “Iraq hoped to weaken Iran’s economy by 
reducing its oil-export capacity… and bring[ing] Iran 
to the negotiating table.”57 When Saddam Hussein 
accelerated the attacks on refineries and tankers in 
1984, Iran retaliated against merchant ships that 
were buying oil from Iraq. Tanker insurance rates 
skyrocketed, and the conflict threatened to paralyze 
oil transport. (It is important to note that the United 
States itself only imported 10 percent of its oil from 
the Gulf, while Europe and Japan relied on the region 
for 30 percent and 60 percent of their respective 
supplies.) Here, allies’ interests influenced U.S. action.
Kuwait sought U.S. permission to “reflag” its 
tankers, sailing under U.S. flags. Reagan agreed 
because he feared the Kuwaitis might otherwise 
turn to the Soviets, who could then win support in 
the region. U.S. naval forces cleared mines, escorted 
tankers, and occasionally engaged in skirmishes 
with Iranian ships.58 The Tanker War illustrates the 
intertwined nature of U.S. interests: allies’ energy 
security, a “Hamiltonian” demand for freedom of the 
seas, and preventing Soviet expansion. 
6. The Persian Gulf War
When Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait 
in 1990, President George H.W. Bush refused an 
adviser’s suggestion that he “get used to a Kuwait-
less world.”59 Allowing Hussein to violate Kuwaiti 
sovereignty would undermine the grand strategy 
of maintaining stability and countering aggression. 
It also threatened energy security, since Iraq would 
have unacceptable price-setting power if it also 
controlled Kuwaiti production. Thus, President 
Bush assembled an international coalition to evict 
Iraq from Kuwait. The United States acted as a sole 
superpower countering the rise of an aggressive 
local power in accordance with its hegemonic 
responsibilities. Yet again, oil was connected to but 
distinct from other interests that deepened U.S. 
involvement.
Bush’s speech to Congress on September 11, 
1990 identified the multiple U.S. interests threatened 
by Saddam’s invasion: countering aggression, energy 
security, and strategic credibility. The primary 
reason, supported by the U.N. and a wide coalition, 
was to counter aggression; this relates to the broader 
strategic goal of preventing a hostile regional 
hegemon. “Vital economic interests are at risk as 
well,” Bush said, acknowledging motives beyond 
simply countering aggression. Bush also stated, “We 
cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by 
one so ruthless.” Finally, the President said it was 
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important that “no one doubt American credbility.”60 
Before the Gulf War, the U.S. military in the 
area had largely stayed “over the horizon” to maintain 
a low profile in these countries through utilizing 
offshore on aircraft carriers or at distant bases.61 
After 1991, U.S. involvement increased dramatically, 
especially in comparison with sharp reductions in 
Europe and Asia. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia accepted 
the U.S. security guarantee and hosted permanent 
U.S. bases. As deployments in Europe shrank 
drastically and those in Asia diminished somewhat, 
the Middle East was the only region with a growing 
U.S. military presence (see chart).62
In 1995, the Navy reestablished the Fifth 
Fleet to create a centralized command over naval 
forces around the Gulf. Along with new bases 
and forward positioning in the region, the United 
States maintained the no-fly zone in Iraq, acting 
as a regional policeman.63 After the Gulf War, the 
United States made deeper commitments to protect 
allies and friends in the region. Though oil lies at the 
root of relationships with Gulf allies, U.S. credibility 
illustrates the importance of protecting allies beyond 
energy security. As with Britain in prior centuries, 
the United States found that its “unipolar moment” as 
the sole superpower brought great responsibilities.
7. The 21st Century: Old Interests, New Threats
After the Gulf War, the United States once again 
turned its attention to energy resources. A massive 
energy shortage in California accompanied by price 
spikes drew election-year attention in 2000. Once 
in office, President George W. Bush delegated the 
energy concern issue to Vice President Dick Cheney, 
a former energy industry executive. The Cheney 
Task Force identified a central policy problem: 
a “fundamental imbalance between supply and 
demand.” It recommended new drilling, natural gas 
pipelines, and hundreds of new power plants, both 
conventional and nuclear.68 
President Bush stressed the importance of 
increasing domestic production and reducing 
consumption. “If we fail to act,” he warned, “our 
country will become more reliant on crude oil, 
putting our national energy security into the hands 
of foreign nations, some of whom do not share our 
interests.”69 After the September 11, 2001 attacks, 
Bush tied energy security to the global war on 
terror. In his 2007 State of the Union, he said U.S. 
reliance on foreign oil made the nation, “vulnerable 
to hostile regimes, and to terrorists who could cause 
huge disruptions of oil shipments, and raise the 
price of oil, and do great harm to our economy.”70 
Military leadership agreed that energy security 
was critical.71 Political leaders and policy experts 
alike predicted the imminence of 
“peak oil”: a maximum global oil output 
followed by decreasing production, shortages, 
recessions, and conflict. 
In 2005, an energy analyst 
writing for The Guardian 
told the public to “kiss your 
lifestyle goodbye.”72 
While the September 
11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks pushed the Bush 
administration to make 
terrorism its primary 
concern in the Middle East, 
the younger Bush was not 
the first president to focus 
on non-state actors in the 
region. In 1983, Reagan 
faced two Islamic Jihad 
attacks in Lebanon. Two 
years later, Hezbollah held 
hostage a passenger plane. 
In 1986, Reagan launched a 
This table shows the multiplicity of interests identified in official U.S. strategy documents. 
U.S. access to oil is always acknowledged, but it has never been the sole motivator.	  
YEAR	   DOCUMENT	   STATEMENT	  OF	  INTERESTS	  
1987	   National	  
Security	  
Strategy	  (NSS)	  
“[M]aintaining	  regional	  stability,	  containing	  and	  reducing	  Soviet	  influence,	  
preserving	  the	  security	  of	  Israel	  and	  our	  other	  friends	  in	  the	  area,	  retaining	  
access	  to	  oil	  on	  reasonable	  terms	  for	  ourselves	  and	  our	  allies,	  and	  curbing	  
state-­‐sponsored	  terrorism.”64	  




“Access	  to	  Persian	  Gulf	  oil	  and	  the	  security	  of	  key	  friendly	  states	  in	  the	  area	  
are	  vital	  to	  U.S.	  national	  security.	  The	  United	  States	  remains	  committed	  to	  
defend	  its	  vital	  interests	  in	  the	  region…	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  any	  
other	  regional	  power	  with	  interests	  inimical	  to	  our	  own.”65	  
1991	   National	  
Security	  
Strategy	  (NSS)	  
“[P]romoting	  stability	  and	  the	  security	  of	  our	  friends,	  maintaining	  a	  free	  
flow	  of	  oil,	  curbing	  the	  proliferation	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  and	  
ballistic	  missiles,	  discouraging	  destabilizing	  conventional	  arms	  sales,	  
countering	  terrorism	  and	  encouraging	  a	  peace	  process	  [consistent]	  with	  our	  
enduring	  commitment	  to	  Israel’s	  security.”66	  




“[O]ur	  overall	  objective	  is	  to	  remain	  the	  predominant	  outside	  power	  in	  the	  
region	  and	  preserve	  U.S.	  and	  Western	  access	  to	  the	  region's	  oil.	  We	  also	  
seek	  to	  deter	  further	  aggression	  in	  the	  region,	  foster	  regional	  stability,	  
protect	  U.S.	  nationals	  and	  property,	  and	  safeguard	  our	  access	  to	  
international	  air	  and	  seaways.	  As	  demonstrated	  by	  Iraq's	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait,	  
it	  remains	  fundamentally	  important	  to	  prevent	  a	  hegemon	  or	  alignment	  of	  
powers	  from	  dominating	  the	  region.”67	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retaliatory strike against Libya for a Berlin nightclub 
bombing. The first attack on U.S. soil came with 
al-Qaeda’s 1993 attempted bombing of the World 
Trade Center, followed by the 1996 Khobar Towers 
attack in Saudi Arabia. Clinton responded to the 
1998 U.S. embassy bombings with cruise missile 
strikes on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Then, just days 
before the 2000 election, al-Qaeda bombed the U.S.S. 
Cole.73 Islamic terrorism has been a persistent threat 
across administrations, with frequent but minor 
responses. The response to September 11, 2001 was 
exponentially larger: the invasion of Afghanistan. 
U.S. focus on counterterrorism in the Middle East 
dates to the 1980s, but September 11, 2001 elevated 
this goal to the core of strategy for the region. 
U.S. military presence in the Middle East 
reached an unprecedented level when the United 
States invaded Iraq in 2003. The administration 
justified leading the nation to war by describing 
Saddam Hussein as a dictator who seemed to pose 
a serious threat and had previously invaded Kuwait. 
Hussein’s history of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) production and use appeared to jeopardize 
regional stability. The justification behind the 
invasion of Iraq touted the need to ensure stability in 
the region, preemptively prevent WMD proliferation, 
and promote democracy. The multiple rationales for 
the invasion reflect the multiplicity of U.S. interests in 
the region. 
8. The Choice Today
As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wound 
down, most U.S. troops were withdrawn. In contrast 
to the 201,414 deployed troops in the Middle East 
in 2003, as of late 2013, the United States only had 
35,000 air, ground, and naval personnel there.74 The 
United States now faces a decision: what is the future 
of U.S. presence in the Middle East? The United 
States can learn from Great Britain’s example when 
it, too, had to choose between retrenchment and 
engagement.
IV. COMPARATIVE STUDY: BRITISH POLICY IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST 1900-1920
I do not care under what system we keep the 
oil, but I am quite clear it is all-important 
for us that this oil should be available.75
— British Foreign Secretary Arthur 
Balfour, August 1918
 As a global hegemon with far-flung economic 
interests and broad defensive commitments, the early 
twentieth century British Empire faced many of the 
same challenges that the United States confronts 
today. Strategically, Britain hoped to prevent the 
rise of a rival that could challenge its hegemony. 
Britain found it necessary to adjust its grand strategy 
to energy revolutions during the early twentieth 
century. British policies in the Middle East during 
this period show that Britain often asserted control 
over oil interests in the region to prevent other 
powers from gaining valuable resources and strategic 
areas at Britain’s expense. Whitehall’s promotion of 
British companies in the region and the renegotiation 
of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement to secure better 
terms matches our argument that the United States 
must remain in the Middle East to prevent the 
dominance of oil resources by other nations. 
 The comparison of Britain and the United 
States rests on the belief that thwarting the rise of a 
rival hegemonic power in the twenty-first century 
has been a basic principle of American grand 
strategy since the fall of the Soviet Union.76 Because 
early twentieth-century Britain similarly sought to 
thwart the ascent of France, Germany, and Russia, 
the comparison is particularly apt. During the early 
twentieth century, the British government repeatedly 
asserted its power in the Middle East through 
diplomacy, military action, and collaboration with oil 
companies. The desire to deny resources and strategic 
positioning to other great powers often motivated 
British moves. While oil became more important 
during World War I, British actions throughout that 
period showed that a hegemonic power must commit 
itself to vital regions and secure oil reserves to block 
the rise of a rival hegemon. The United States today 
confronts a similar situation as Britain did in the 
period surrounding World War I.
 Throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century, Britain and Russia engaged in the “Great 
Game” for control of Persia and the modern-day 
Middle East. Russia’s desire for warm water ports 
and the British need to protect trade routes to India 
drove the competition. Oil added another dimension 
to the Great Game. British collaboration with oil 
interests began in earnest when the Foreign Office 
supported William Knox D’Arcy’s efforts to purchase 
an oil concession in Persia in 1901. Whitehall saw a 
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British oil company in Persia as a means of asserting 
British influence while separating a weak Persia 
from Russia.77 Persian oil grew still more important 
when First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill 
shifted Britain’s battleships from coal to oil fueling in 
1913. Accordingly, Churchill persuaded Parliament 
to purchase for the Admiralty a majority stake in the 
fledgling Anglo-Persian Oil Company, founded by 
D’Arcy.78 With the financial and diplomatic support 
of the British state, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
grew into the corporation that is today BP.
 In parallel to Persia, the British government 
sought an oil concession in the Mesopotamian region 
of the Ottoman Empire, although no company had 
yet drilled for oil there. Britain was initially drawn 
to Mesopotamia to protect its approaches to India 
and maintain the balance of power. In this period, 
Germany was negotiating the construction of the 
Baghdad Railway, and the German concession 
included mineral rights. Britain thus saw the attempts 
of D’Arcy and others to win another oil concession 
in Mesopotamia as strong projections of British 
interests.79 Companies’ holdings allowed Britain 
to compete with other powers in a region where it 
had heretofore lacked a strong presence. In 1914, 
the British and German governments negotiated 
the combination of their various holdings in the 
Ottoman Empire under the Turkish Petroleum 
Company.80 The willingness to collaborate with rival 
Germany in an international corporation shows that 
Britain was motivated by the pragmatic need for a 
foothold in a region under heavy German influence, 
rather than an ideological craving for territorial 
control. In the current post-colonial age, such flexible 
tactics are all the more applicable to the United States 
and its presence in the Middle East.
 The mechanized warfare of World War 
I demonstrated the importance of oil reserves. 
Between 1915 and 1917, the Admiralty’s 
consumption of oil increased from 80,500 tons to 
190,000 tons. The number of trucks in the newly 
mechanized army grew from one hundred to 60,000 
by the war’s end. Explosives required the chemical 
toluol, which was derived from crude oil.81 Before 
the oil shortages of 1917, the British had granted 
France postwar control over the Mosul region in 
Mesopotamia, then considered likely to be oil-rich, in 
the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Foreign Office’s 
hope to satiate Russian and French demands for 
power in the region led it to ignore the Admiralty’s 
recommendation to retain Mosul. The result was that 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement was unfavorable in oil 
terms, as it surrendered Mosul and its surrounding 
reserves to France.82 
 As in Persia, access to oil and the denial of 
French dominance became more important than 
formal territorial control of the region. In August 
1918, Secretary to the War Cabinet Maurice Hankey 
led the government to reconsider its strategic 
interests and renegotiate the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
to gain access to Mesopotamian reserves.83 The 
wartime oil shortage and subsequent Bolshevik 
Revolution, which removed the need for a buffer 
between the Middle East and Russia, altered the 
strategic calculus.84 After the armistice with the 
Ottoman Empire, the British army seized Mosul by 
force to improve Whitehall’s negotiating position.85 
Despite repeated breaks in high-level negotiations, 
in 1920, British and French officials finalized the San 
Remo Agreement, under which Britain won Mosul 
and the Mesopotamian mandate in exchange for 
backing a French mandate in Syria. France would 
receive 25 percent of British Mesopotamian oil and 
pipeline rights.86 
 Studying British strategy in the Middle East 
demonstrates the importance of global balance 
of power dynamics in resource-rich regions. Like 
Britain, the United States is a global hegemon and 
large-scale oil consumer that could face competition 
from a rival power with increasing energy demands, 
most likely China. However, the United States 
could improve on the British precedent by avoiding 
unfavorable treaties like Sykes-Picot and taking a 
tougher stance akin to the position Britain adopted 
to achieve the more advantageous San Remo 
Agreement. Just as the British presence in the Middle 
East fulfilled the dual goals of securing energy 
resources and thwarting the rise of a rival, so too 
would keeping American forces in the Middle East 
increase leverage over potential rivals. As we will 
discuss later in this paper, China’s growing demand 
for oil and its investments in the Middle East render 
it the most threatening rival in the region. Distant 
powers like France threatened British hegemony in 
the Middle East in the early twentieth century, and 
the United States accordingly cannot discount the 
Chinese threat to the far-flung Middle East, especially 
in today’s more globalized world. Great powers seek 
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the resources they need, and those areas become the 
locations of strategic competition.
  British strategy in both the pre-war and 
post-war periods gave Britain leverage in the 
diplomacy of resource allocation in the Middle 
East. In neither case did Britain hoard Middle 
Eastern resources through territorial annexation. 
Rather, Britain sought to increase its sway over rival 
powers. Through the Turkish Petroleum Company, 
Britain gained a foothold in a region of burgeoning 
German influence that could have proved valuable 
in tempering German power had World War I not 
broken out. Likewise, Britain did not seek to entirely 
exclude France when renegotiating the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. Under the San Remo Agreement, France 
retained pipeline rights and control of twenty-five 
percent of oil. Yet, Britain held the leverage to cut 
off France’s oil flows and affect the regional supply 
through its dominant presence. As we discuss at 
length in our proposal section, the United States 
should ensure that it remains the strongest outside 
power in the Middle East.
 The case of Britain shows that remaining the 
hegemonic power in a region does not necessarily 
require a massive force presence or the complete 
exclusion of other powers. While the mandate 
system for the Middle East was partly a response to 
emerging Wilsonian ideals of self-determination, 
it also suited the British interest in steering the 
course of events in the Middle East without costly 
annexation. Britain used its influence to reach an 
agreement with France that guaranteed the British 
supply of oil and prevented France or any other 
country from becoming too powerful in the region. 
The United States can draw lessons from the British 
experience in leveraging economic power and force 
presence to prevent rivals from threatening Middle 
Eastern oil resources. To apply British Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan’s famous historical analogy, the 
British case should serve as the “Greek” example for 
our present day “Rome.” 
V. OUR PROPOSAL 
In spite of the Shale Revolution, the United 
States retains three key interests in a continued 
presence in the Persian Gulf. In order to advance 
these goals, America requires a continued military 
presence in the region. In his book, The Next Decade, 
George Friedman lists three primary reasons for U.S.-
involvement in the Middle East: “to maintain the 
regional balance of power; to make certain that the 
flow of oil is not interrupted; and to defeat Islamist 
groups centered there that threaten the United 
States.”87 Friedman illustrates that a multitude of 
interests, not just oil, keep the United States involved 
in the Persian Gulf. These interests require action. As 
Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh write, “Ignoring the 
region’s problems will not make them go away.”88 
We argue that the presence of America’s 
Fifth Fleet and current troop levels in the region 
are necessary, especially in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
and Qatar. Then, we examine the three priorities 
Friedman illustrates—the global nature of the energy 
market, our Asian and Middle Eastern allies, and 
the need to prevent another power’s dominance—
to demonstrate why America’s presence will be 
necessary even after the Shale Revolution. 
Strategic Force Posture
What would an ongoing strategic presence 
in the Middle East look like? As we have shown, 
there is a strong need for a U.S. military presence 
in the Middle East. Our previous historical review 
demonstrates that the United States maintained a 
sizable presence prior to the invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
U.S. forces increased dramatically in the region, even 
outside the direct combat area. We argue that the U.S. 
should maintain the current U.S. posture in the Gulf, 
including the newly established bases and continued 
operations of the Fifth Fleet.
Maintaining the Fifth Fleet presence is crucial 
for ensuring access to the global oil market. The 
United States and its allies rely on access to oil 
through the Persian Gulf.90 By patrolling the Persian 
Gulf, the Fifth Fleet allows the United States to ensure 
open seas and global commerce. Twenty percent of 
all oil traded worldwide passes through the Straits of 
Hormuz. 91 Oil trade through these straits includes 
twenty-seven countries and 7.5 million square miles, 
in addition to choke points such as the Suez Canal 
and the Bab al-Madeb in Yemen.92 If another power 
such as Iran or China were to be able to gain control 
of these waters, it could upset the global energy 
supply and extract concessions from U.S. allies.93
The U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, which 
oversees the Fifth Fleet, advances “the interests of 
the United States and the security and prosperity of 
the region” according to their mission statement.94 
Through its mission of promoting security and 
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prosperity across these major shipping lanes, the 
Fifth Fleet acts as both a deterrent and protective 
force. In order to achieve its goals and protect U.S. 
and Allied interests, the Fifth Fleet requires a sizable 
presence of 7,179 military personnel stationed at 
Naval Support Activity Bahrain, seven naval bases, 
and two aircraft carriers that operate on a rotational 
basis.95 While minor adjustments could be made 
in coming years, a large naval force is necessary to 
protect U.S. strategic interests in the region.
Besides a strong naval presence, the United 
States must also maintain robust air and ground 
capabilities in order to support peace and stability in 
the region and prevent the rise of another power. Air 
bases give the United States an organized, forward-
deployed presence, allowing it to secure the Gulf. 
For example, U.S. Central Command Headquarters 
at Al Udeid represents the strategic foundation of 
the United States military force in the Middle East 
and provides “mission-essential combat power, 
aeromedical evacuation and intelligence support 
for three theaters of operations.”96 Al Udeid fields 
crucial capabilities with over ninety different types 
of aircraft, including the KC-10 Extenders and KC-
135 Stratotankers.97 These two aircraft extend the 
reach of fighters and bombers, allowing the United 
States to project its power throughout the region.98 
Maintaining the Al Udeid Airbase and U.S. air 
presence deters would-be rivals. 
Reductions in troop 
levels would put these strategic 
goals at risk. The long-range 
aerial refueling and transport 
capabilities of the aircraft 
stationed at Al Udeid airbase, 
not to mention its use as a 
command base, make for a 
robust military relationship 
with Qatar and other Gulf 
partners of the United States. 
In December 2013, former 
Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel noted that there are more 
than 10,000 forward-deployed 
soldiers in the Gulf area.99 We 
argue that the Shale Revolution 
does not change the rationale 
behind keeping 10,000 troops 
and the Fifth Fleet stationed in 
the Gulf region. These bases, ships, and troops are 
required due to the global nature of energy markets, 
our allies’ interests, and the need to deter a potential 
competitor. 
1. The Global Nature of Energy Markets
 The global and interconnected nature 
of energy markets requires the United States to 
reexamine its goal of energy independence and 
recognize its larger interests in the Middle East. 
Because of interconnected nature of the global 
energy market, the United States will have a lasting 
interest in the stability of the Gulf States and their 
oil reserves. Though the Shale Revolution has 
reduced U.S. imports of Middle Eastern oil, it does 
not eliminate the need to support valuable regional 
partners. If it continues, the decrease in oil prices 
brought about by the Shale Revolution will pose 
a serious threat to the fiscal health of the Gulf 
states and their leaders’ ability to purchase popular 
legitimacy. While the United States may welcome 
long-term pressures for democratic reform, the strain 
may cause instability that threatens Gulf regimes over 
the next ten years—and by extension, the stability of 
the global oil markets they supply. An enduring and 
credible U.S. military presence would hedge against 
this dangerous prospect.
Despite the rhetoric over attaining complete 
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“energy independence,” the United States will 
continued to be subject to global prices as both an 
importer and potential exporter. As J. Robinson 
West and Raad Alkadiri write, “[C]rude oil is a 
global, price fungible commodity… [so] the U.S. 
economy will remain vulnerable to any events there 
[the Middle East] that disrupt supplies from the 
region.”100 Even if the United States had more fuel 
than it could consume, it still would be connected to 
the Middle East under the global pricing system.101 
Oil is a globally traded commodity; therefore, 
the price of oil is dependent on global supply and 
demand, not on local supply and demand. Moreover, 
the United States will continue to import specific 
grades of oil, even if the United States becomes a net 
oil exporter, because refineries are built specifically 
for certain grades of crude oil.102 Finally, U.S. supply 
is still significantly less than future demand. “Bullish” 
estimates predict fifteen million barrels per day of 
U.S. liquefied oil production by 2020. By comparison, 
the United States consumed approximately nineteen 
million barrels of oil-based liquefied fuels per day in 
2009.103 While the Shale Revolution may reduce U.S. 
dependence on Middle Eastern supplies, it will not 
entirely eliminate the influence of Middle Eastern oil.
The Shale Revolution seems unlikely to radically 
upend the major oil-producing states in the Gulf 
in the immediate future. GCC states still produce a 
quarter of the world’s oil. Although the United States 
has been importing less OPEC oil, global demand 
remains robust. As recently as July 2014, OPEC 
anticipated “needing to raise its production to meet 
demand for [its] oil.”104 Indeed, until the sliding 
prices of recent months, which analysts attribute 
more to falling Asian economic growth than U.S. 
unconventional production, oil prices remained 
relatively high compared to historical levels at prices 
between ninety dollars and 120 dollars (nominal) per 
barrel from 2009-2013.105 A Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) report expects Asian 
demand for oil, though temporarily faltering, to 
recover.106 CSIS concludes that the Shale Revolution 
is “unlikely to transform the Gulf directly” or pose 
major geopolitical or economic threats to the region’s 
largest producers.107 
 Yet, the Shale Revolution’s downward 
pressure on oil and gas prices pose two daunting 
challenges to Gulf stability. The first is diminished 
OPEC influence. Since 1971, the cartel’s Gulf 
producers have wielded control of global oil 
markets and commanded prices that sit well above 
production costs. The Shale Revolution puts OPEC’s 
long-term future in jeopardy, especially if increased 
supplies decrease prices.108 This event, Blackwill and 
O’Sullivan argue, would severely test OPEC cohesion. 
Individual producers would likely refuse to curb 
production and scramble for the largest piece of a 
shrinking pie. Citigroup oil analyst Ed Morse agrees, 
and predicts that the Shale Revolution will lead to 
the “prevalence of market forces in international 
energy pricing, putting an end to OPEC’s forty-year 
dominance.”109 
 Falling prices could produce budget shortfalls 
in Arab states. Already, oil prices have fallen below 
the break-even points necessary for Bahrain, Oman, 
and Saudi Arabia to balance their budgets.110 Oil 
revenues are important to Gulf stability because 
of the domestic and military programs they fund. 
Leaders in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia use oil 
revenues to provide citizens with expensive cradle-to-
grave welfare systems and energy subsidies.111 These 
“gifts” are designed to pacify citizens and insulate 
autocratic regimes from popular discontent.112 In 
2014, Bahrain spent a whopping 12.5 percent of GDP 
on energy subsidies alone.113 Kuwait subsidized 
domestic energy at the cost of seventeen billion 
dollars, or roughly 25 percent of all government 
spending.114 Kuwaiti consumers enjoy one of the 
lowest gas prices in the world: ninety-one cents per 
gallon.115 Pressures for expanded subsidy programs 
have grown ever since the onset of the Arab Spring. 
For example, in 2011, former Saudi King Abdullah 
unveiled a domestic benefits package worth $130 
billion. Rising domestic expenditures have pushed 
Saudi Arabia’s oil price budgetary break-even point 
up from over seventy-eight dollars in 2011 to ninety-
eight dollars in 2014. Iran requires prices above 131 
dollars, up from eighty-four dollars just three years 
ago. 
 At least for the moment, most of the Gulf 
States have sufficient reserves to weather a temporary 
fall in oil prices. Saudi Arabia, for example, has 
sufficient foreign reserves to self-finance decades of 
deficits. It sat on 737 billion dollars in reserves as 
of August 2014 (almost three times current annual 
spending).116 However, if the Shale Revolution and 
concurrent developments keep prices within the 
seventy to ninety dollars range over the next decade 
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or two, as Morse predicts it will, countries with high 
break-even points and smaller cash reserves may face 
serious trouble.117
 Any decision to cut domestic spending, 
whether out of necessity or inclination, could invite 
domestic backlash or provoke unrest. However, 
previous periods of suppressed oil revenues suggest 
that major spending cuts are unlikely. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, Qatar, the U.A.E., and Saudi Arabia all 
covered their fiscal needs by taking on large debts 
rather than making politically sensitive cuts.118 
Middle East analyst Carol Barnett expects that they 
would pursue the same measures, although doing 
so would not eliminate the possibility of turmoil. In 
fact, a continued focus on subsidies could hamstring 
these regimes’ ability to make investments that are 
necessary to diversify their economies and spur 
future economic growth.119 If Gulf nations fail to 
provide meaningful employment to their young, 
growing populations, expanded subsidy packages 
alone will not alone be able to mitigate unrest 
from domestic unemployment. The possibility that 
festering internal conflicts in countries like Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia could boil over in the face of rising 
unemployment rates, low oil prices, and sectarian 
divides could “pose a danger to the stability of Saudi 
Arabia and thus to the United States.” 120 
2. Fueling American Allies
 An ongoing U.S. presence in the Middle 
East is critical to U.S. allies in Europe, Asia, and the 
Middle East itself. Critics such as political scientist 
Barry Posen argue that protecting allies’ access 
to energy is not the United States’ responsibility, 
encourages free riding, and constitutes a “moral 
hazard.”121 Nonetheless, U.S. forces must remain in 
order to preserve the world order that the United 
States enjoys as a superpower.
a. Asian Allies’ Interests in the Middle East
The perceived choice between pursuing the 
Asia Pivot and remaining in the Middle East ignores 
the fact that the United States’ Asian allies have 
crucial energy interests in the Middle East and rely 
upon the U.S. to protect such interests. In 2012, 97 
percent of oil exports from the U.A.E. went to Asia. 
The Saudis exported 54 percent of their oil to Asia. 
Indeed, with 85 percent of the oil shipped through 
the Straits of Hormuz destined for Asia in 2014, East 
Asian countries have an overwhelming interest in 
the stability in the Middle East.122 Asia’s reliance on 
Middle Eastern energy requires the protection of the 
sea lanes by the Fifth Fleet to maintain reliable trade. 
For an in-depth example, oil accounted for 45 
percent of Japan’s total primary energy supplies in 
2011. In 2012, 83 percent of Japan’s crude oil came 
from the Middle East.123 Japan’s use of oil and gas is 
only going to grow as its nuclear power capabilities 
decline due to the Fukushima nuclear accident of 
March 2011. In a National Bureau of Asian Research 
special report, Tsutomu Toichi argues that, if the 
United States retrenched, Japan would need to 
provide economic and humanitarian assistance to 
the Middle East in order to stabilize its source of oil. 
Japan is dependent on free navigation of the high seas 
to transport these energy supplies.124 Japan would 
suffer if instability or an aggressive China interrupted 
oil production or transportation.
The South Korean economy also requires 
Middle Eastern oil. Roughly 80 percent of Korean 
crude oil imports originated in the Middle East 
in 2010, with 70 percent of the imports a part of 
long-term contracts.125 Amidst concerns about the 
stability of the Middle East, Korea has sought to 
diversify its energy sources by offering a tax rebate 
for fuel sold from non-Middle East areas. Korea also 
began receiving oil imports from Alaska in October 
2014, signed a free-trade agreement with Canada, 
and reached out to Russia about the possibility of a 
natural gas arrangement. 126 However, these policies 
have not drastically curtailed Korean dependence 
on the Middle East oil. According to U.S. Naval 
War College Professor Terence Roehrig et al., “[a]
ny political and economic turmoil from the Middle 
East may endanger a stable energy supply.”127 South 
Korean companies have built oil refineries and 
energy infrastructure throughout the Middle East.128 
Desperate for a secure energy supply, South Korea 
relies on the U.S. presence in the Middle East. 
b. European Allies – The Qatar Connection
The effects of the U.S. Shale Revolution resonate 
throughout energy markets across the globe. The 
Shale Revolution presents new opportunities to open 
energy supplies to our allies in Europe. These allies 
have traditionally relied upon regional sources of 
natural gas and oil, especially Russia. New sources 
of natural gas exports from nations in the Middle 
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East provide an opportunity for Europe to diversify 
its energy supply. However, this change will only be 
possible if the United States continues to ensure a 
stable Middle East. 
Qatar has been a major player in the increased 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments to Europe.129 
LNG exports from Qatar to Europe are estimated to 
increase by 33 percent in 2014, which would boost 
the natural gas supply in Europe by 6.64 million 
metric tons.130 Qatar’s significant LNG export 
capacity has “undercut the price of oil-indexed gas 
from Russia and Norway and brought new liquidity 
to northern European gas markets.”131 These new 
supplies account for the increase in the amount of 
natural gas in Europe traded on the spot market 
from 15 percent in 2008 to over 50 percent in 
2014.132 The increase in supply from Qatari LNG 
imports decreases the spot price of natural gas in the 
short term. Over the long term, this development 
provides an opportunity for Europe to reduce its 
energy reliance on Russia and improve its bargaining 
position with state-owned monopoly Gazprom. 
These European imports are only available as 
a result of the Shale Revolution in the United States 
and the continued ability of Qatar to safely export 
LNG. The explosive growth of domestic natural 
gas production from shale reserves in the United 
States has greatly reduced our demand for natural 
gas imports from abroad. In 2005, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) forecasted that the 
United States would import 29 percent of its natural 
gas in 2013, or about 9.4 billion cubic feet per day. 
As a result of the Shale Revolution, actual imports 
in 2013 accounted for only 5 percent of domestic 
consumption.133 This difference means that most 
of the 9.4 billion cubic feet per day of imports the 
United States would otherwise have purchased from 
foreign suppliers is now available to other consumers, 
including European countries. A stable Middle 
East is a prerequisite to these supplies reaching the 
international market. 
In keeping with its close relationship with the 
United States, Qatar has joined other countries in 
calling for a U.S. force presence in the region. Osman 
Antwi-Boateng, assistant professor of political 
science at U.A.E. University, explains that the Qatari 
government enjoys greater military capabilities 
and influence as a result of its relationship with the 
United States.134 Given an especially weak Qatari 
military, the Arab nation relies on its relationship 
with the United States for its protection.135 For the 
reasons listed above, that security is vital to European 
natural gas supplies.
As with Qatar, the United States enjoys strong 
military relationships with its other Arab partners, 
including Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, and 
Kuwait.136 During the Gulf War, these ties were built 
on the Arab consensus that “a dominant and strong 
country in the region is necessary in order to prevent 
regional instability and crisis.”137 A relationship with 
the U.S. military allows Arab countries to secure 
themselves against their regional rival, Iran. The 
security relationship between the United States and 
its Arab partners therefore remains a crucial factor 
both in the region and in opening alternate sources of 
fuel for European allies. 
3. Preventing Another Power from Dominating the 
Middle East
 These alternative sources of fuel would be 
threatened if a rival power came to dominate the oil 
supplies. The threat of another hegemon dominating 
Middle Eastern oil supplies and the necessity of 
balancing against that rival is the subject of great 
debate. While those in favor of retrenchment argue 
that there is no great power in the Middle East, they 
neglect to consider China’s interests. China will likely 
import three quarters of its oil from the Middle East 
by 2030.138 In its current force posture, the United 
States protects China’s oil supply. The Fifth Fleet 
monitors the Persian Gulf, and the United States 
promotes regional stability through measures such 
as airstrikes against the Islamic State and the Levant 
(ISIL).139 China has attempted to offset its reliance 
on Middle Eastern oil and U.S. protection of the 
Persian Gulf by importing natural gas from Russia, 
exploring the South China Sea, investing in Africa, 
and strengthening ties with Iran. However, China 
consumes 10.28 million barrels per day, second only 
to the United States as of 2012.140 China’s robust 
appetite for oil suggests that it may seek more control 
in the Middle East, especially if the United States 
were to retrench. 
China has a strategic interest in securing Middle 
Eastern oil, but it also will likely expand its role 
in the Middle East in the absence of United States 
protection of the region.141 “Securing” the area 
would not necessarily entail a large military presence, 
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but could involve increased economic control and 
diplomatic influence. China views the Middle East 
as being “integral to Asia’s power politics.” 142 It has 
already increased its presence internationally in the 
energy domain as it focuses on “ownership” and 
“physical controls of barrels along with future access.” 
Such measures are part of China’s “go-out strategy,” 
according to the National Bureau of Asian Research 
Energy Security Program’s Research Director Michael 
Herberg.143 With Xi Jinping increasing China’s 
international role, the country is poised to deepen 
its relations with the Middle East and seek “physical 
controls.” Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal has 
observed that, “China is very eager to fill any vacuum 
that the United States may create.”144 
Chinese actions have reinforced the validity 
this reasoning. In 2013, it was China, not the United 
States, which gained most from the Iraqi oil boom. 
China funded airports near Iraq’s border with Iran 
to ferry Chinese workers to and from Iraqi oil 
fields.145Although China has not joined in strikes 
against ISIL, Chinese strategic interests indicate 
that it may expand its involvement in the region 
in the absence of U.S. forces. If China becomes an 
influential power in the Middle East, the United 
States would face a great power challenge worthy of 
a regional presence. It would be ironic if the United 
States succeeded in limiting China’s influence in Asia 
with the Asia Pivot, but failed to contain China’s 
growing role in the Middle East. 
Even if China expands its presence in the 
Middle East in order to secure its energy interests, 
why should the United States care? First, in its 
current posture, the United States maintains 
considerable leverage over China and other great 
powers. China currently lacks a large enough blue 
water navy to secure the major sea lanes in the 
Persian Gulf.146 By controlling China’s access to part 
of the energy market, the United States gains strategic 
leverage. Beijing believes the United States may be 
maintaining control of major shipping lanes in order 
to “exploit China’s energy weakness.”147 While that 
is not the main reason for U.S. control of shipping 
lanes, it does strengthen the United States vis-à-vis 
China. 
Chinese involvement could upset the regional 
balance. In conjunction with considerations about 
low oil prices destabilizing OPEC countries, a 
Chinese economic presence would further escalate 
conflict. Harvard Weatherhead Center fellow Colonel 
Christopher Sage warns that a “localized arms race 
could develop as the U.S. and China flood weaponry, 
both seaborne and otherwise, into the region. Such a 
scenario, combined with mistrust and miscalculation, 
could spark a conflict no one desires.”148 Sage’s 
prediction gains legitimacy with an examination of 
the historical precedent of China’s role in the Darfur 
Crisis. In 2007, Sudan accounted for 6 percent of 
China’s oil imports while China accounted for 40 
percent of Sudan’s oil exports.149 From 2003 to 
2006, China sold the Sudanese government fifty-five 
million dollars of small arms in addition to aircraft 
and large weaponry.150 Human rights groups and 
news outlets blamed China for backing the Sudanese 
government and fueling the crisis in the interest 
of oil.151 In the case of Sudan, China showed a 
willingness to escalate regional conflicts in order 
to protect its oil interests. Similar involvement in a 
volatile Middle East would further harm the region 
and destabilize U.S. allies.
Burden-sharing with China in the Middle East 
is not necessarily problematic. In fact, Chatham 
House scholar John V. Mitchell and others support 
burden sharing.152 Our comparative case showed 
that great powers can negotiate power-sharing deals, 
as Britain did with Germany and France. However, 
a rapid decline in the United States’ presence in 
the Middle East could cause long-term strategic 
conflict between the United States and China that 
would destabilize the region, and perhaps the 
world. Arguments against a continued presence in 
the Middle East suggest there is no possible great 
power in the region. In contrast, a U.S. drawdown 
from the region has the potential to increase 
Chinese involvement. As our case study shows, 
when energy supplies are at stake, great powers are 
likely to seek regional control. In order to mitigate 
possible competition in the Middle East and promote 
peace and stability, the United States should avoid 
retrenchment and retain a strategic presence in the 
region.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Shale Revolution should not encourage 
the United States to withdraw from the Middle 
East. A review of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East since the 1970s shows that the United States 
has historically held broad strategic interests in 
the region. Those strategic interests will endure 
beyond specific crises and require a long-term U.S. 
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commitment. In comparison, Britain’s policies in the 
Middle East resonate with the need for the United 
States to remain in the region, lest a rival attempt to 
assert control. 
Maintaining an active U.S. troop presence 
through the air, land, and sea bases in Gulf-ally 
nations will be necessary for the United States to 
pursue its four traditional goals: promote a regional 
balance of power, stabilize global energy markets, 
protect allies’ energy supplies, and deter potential 
rivals. The dominance of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in 
the Persian Gulf checks the rise of a challenge for 
regional hegemony, while U.S. bases in the region 
shore up the security concerns for Gulf partner 
states in combating threats like terrorism and WMD 
proliferation. In a world of interconnected energy 
markets in which the United States’ European and 
Asian allies continue to rely on the Middle East for 
energy imports, the United States cannot afford to 
abandon the region.
 The U.S. Shale Revolution undoubtedly 
changes the way the United States looks at its energy 
needs. Nonetheless, the United States cannot afford to 
risk its strategic priorities in the Middle East. When 
faced with the question of whether to go or to stay in 
the Middle East, the United States must not pull back 
in retreat, but instead accept its continuing role as the 
world’s sole superpower.
Bibliography
Accenture. “Accenture Reports Unconventional Oil and Gas Operators Can 
Reduce Costs through Better Managing Above-Ground Operations.” 
October 20, 2014. http://newsroom.accenture.com/news/accenture-
reports-unconventional-oil-and-gas-operators-can-reduce-costs-
through-better-managing-above-ground-operations.htm.
Alkadiri, Raad, and J. Robinson West. “Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf Region.” In 
Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition, edited by 
Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2013. http://goo.gl/bwxyYw.
Andersson, Hilary. “China ‘is Fueling the War in Darfur.’” BBC, July 13, 2008. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7503428.stm.
Antwi-Boateng, Osman. “The Rise of Qatar as a Soft Power.” European 
Scientific Journal, December 2013. http://eujournal.org/index.php/
esj/article/viewFile/2337/2210.
Arango, Tim and Clifford Krauss. “China Is Reaping Biggest Benefits of 
Iraq Oil Boom.” New York Times, June 2, 2013. http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/06/03/world/middleeast/china-reaps-biggest-benefits-of-
iraq-oil-boom.html
Auslin, Michael. “ The Slow Death of Obama’s Asia Pivot.” Wall Street 
Journal, February 3, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424
052702303942404579360282240892994.
Barnett, Carolyn. “The New Energy Revolution and the Gulf.” Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2014.
Beeler, John F. British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866-1880. 
Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
Beeler, John. “Steam, Strategy and Schurman: Imperial Defence in the Post-
Crimean Era, 1856-1905.” In Greg Kennedy and Keith Neilson, eds., 
Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald 
Mackenzie Schurman. London: Frank Cass, 1996.
Bell, Coral. “From Carter to Reagan.” Foreign Affairs 63, no. 3 (1984).
Blackwill, Robert D., and Meghan O’Sullivan. “America’s Energy Edge: The 
Geopolitical Consequences of the Shale Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 
(March/April 2014). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140750/
robert-d-blackwill-and-meghan-l-osullivan/americas-energy-edge.
Blair, Dennis, and Michael Hagee. “Oil Security 2025: U.S. National Security 




Bordoff, Jason and Trevor Houser. “American Gas to the Rescue?” Center on 
Global Energy Policy. New York: Columbia University, September 22, 
2001. http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/on-the-record/new-report-
american-gas-rescue.
Bradley, Matt and Brian Spegele. “Middle East Fuels Fresh China-U.S. 
Tensions.” Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2013. http://online.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424127887324755104579073283948517714.
“Breakeven Oil Prices for U.S. Shale: Analysts Estimates.” Reuters. 
October 23, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/
idUSL3N0SH5N220141023.
Brooks, Stephen G., G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. 
“Lean Forward: in Defense of American Engagement.” Foreign 
Affairs (January/February 2013). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-
wohlforth/lean-forward. 
Bush, George H.W. “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress.” Speech, 
Washington, D.C., September 11, 1990, Miller Center, http://
millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3425.
------. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” The White House, 
1991, http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=52.
Bush, George W. “2007 State of the Union Address” Speech, Washington, 
D.C., January 23, 2007, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
stateoftheunion2007.html.
------. “Energy Policy.” Speech. St. Paul, MN. May 17, 2001. Washington Post. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/
bushtext051701.html.
Carter, Jimmy. “State of the Union Address.” Speech. Washington, D.C. 
January 23, 1980. Miller Center. http://millercenter.org/president/
carter/es/speech-3404.
Catanese, David. “Rand: Long Middle East War ‘Insolvable.’” U.S. News, 
January 13, 2015. http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/run-
2016/2015/01/13/rand-paul-no-answer-to-long-war-in-middle-east.
Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Facebook: Middle East.” N.d. 
Accessed March 19, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/wfbExt/region_mde.html.
Chen, Dingding. “China Should Send Troops to Fight ISIS.” The Diplomat, 
September 12, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-should-
send-troops-to-fight-isis/.
Chevron. “Natural Gas from Shale.” July 2014. http://www.chevron.com/
deliveringenergy/naturalgas/shalegas/.
Crane, Keith, et al., Imported Oil and U.S. National Security. Arlington, 
VA: RAND, 2009. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monographs/2009/RAND_MG838.pdf, 61.
Cunningham, Nick. “The Geopolitical Implications of U.S. Natural Gas 
Exports.” American Security Project. March 5, 2013. http://www.
americansecurityproject.org/the-geopolitical-implications-of-u-s-
natural-gas-exports/.
Darvishi, Farhad, and Ameneh Jalilvand. “Impacts of U.S. Military 
Presence in the Arabic Countries of Persian Gulf.” Geopolitics 
Quarterly 6, no. 4(Winter 2010). http://www.sid.ir/EN/VEWSSID/J_
pdf/108020112009.pdf.
Davies, Paul J. “‘Asian Century’ Will Dominate Global Financial Markets.” 
Financial Times, April 7, 2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/433bf1e4-
be2a-11e3-b44a-00144feabdc0.html.
Davis, Julie H. “Obama to Visit Estonia to Reassure Baltic Allies Over 
Russia.” The New York Times, September 2, 2014. http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/09/03/ world/europe/obama-to-visit-estonia-to-reassure-
baltic-allies-over-russia.html.
Deloitte. “Who Goes There? Friend or Foe: Gas, Russia and the Middle 
138
columbia university journal of politics & society
East.” Fall 2013. http://www2.deloitte.com/be/en/pages/energy-and-
resources/articles/who-goes-there-friend-or-foe.html.
Desilver, Drew. “Americans Want to Mind Their Own Business.” Pew 
Research Center. July 29, 2013. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/07/29/americans-want-to-mind-their-own-business/.
Evans, John R. Comment on “U.S. Army Corps: Assuring NATO 
Preparedness.” Brookings Institution. Blog. September 19, 2014. 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/09/19-us-
army-corps-assuring-nato-preparedness-evans.
Feaver, Peter. “American Grand Strategy at the Crossroads: Leading from 
the Front, Leading from Behind, or Not Leading at All.” In Richard 
Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, eds., America’s Path: Grand Strategy 
and the Next Administration. CNAS Report. May 2012. http://www.
cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AmericasPath_
FontaineAndLord.pdf.
Ferrier, R.W. The History of the British Petroleum Company, Vol. 1: The 
Developing Years 1901-1932. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982. 
Fitch, Asa. “Oil Price Slide May Curb Gulf States’ Spending Plans.” Wall 
Street Journal, November 23, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/oil-
price-slide-may-curb-gulf-states-spending-plans-1416792930.
Friedman, Thomas L. “Win, Win, Win, Win, Win.” New York Times, 
December 27, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/
opinion/28friedman.html.
“Gas Pricing in Europe: Careful What You Wish For.” The Economist, July 14, 
2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21558433.
“Gazprom and European Gas Markets: Paying the Piper.” The 
Economist, January 4, 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/
business/21592639-european-efforts-reduce-russian-state-owned-
companys-sway-over-gas-prices-have-been.
GlobalSecurity.org. “379th Air Expeditionary Wing.” N.d. Accessed 
December 5, 2014. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/
usaf/379aew.htm.
Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Middle East: Goodbye to All That.” Bloomberg 
Businessweek, September 5, 2014. http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2012-09-05/the-middle-east-goodbye-to-all-that.
Gordon, Kate. “How the U.S. Oil Boom Will Change the Markets and 
Geopolitics.” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2013. http:// online.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084.
Gray, Steven. “Black Diamonds: Coal, the Royal Navy, and British Imperial 
Coaling Stations, circa 1870-1914.” D.Phil dissertation. University of 
Warwick. March 2014. Dissertation provided by author.
Haas, Richard N. “The Irony of American Strategy: Putting the Middle East 
in Proper Perspective.” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2013). http://www.
foreignaffairs .com/articles/139106/richard-n-haass/the-irony-of-
american-strategy.
Hajjar, Sami G. “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and 
Prospects.” U.S. Strategic Studies Institute. March 2002. http://www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub185.pdf.
Harkavy, Robert E. Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000. 
London: Routledge, 2007.
Helmer, John. The Upcoming Gas Revolution. Stockholm: Actagon Research 
Institute, February 2013. http://johnhelmer.net/wp-content/
uploads/2013/02/The-Upcoming-Gas-Revolution.pdf.
Heo, Uk, Terence Roehrig, and Jungmin Seo. Korean Security in a Changing 
East Asia. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007. http://
goo.gl/nKoMfV.
Herberg, Mikkal E. “The Rise of Energy and Resource Nationalism in Asia.” 
In Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose, eds. Ashley J. 
Tellis, Andrew Marble, and Travis Tanner. Seattle: National Bureau of 
Asian Research, 2010. http://goo.gl/ky4Z8i.
Herbst, Monica. “Oil for China, Guns for Darfur.” Bloomberg Businessweek, 
March 14, 2008. http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-03-14/
oil-for-china-guns-for-darfurbusinessweek-business-news-stock-
market-and-financial-advice.
Hoeven, John. Speech on Keystone XL Pipeline. 113th Congress, 1st session. 
Congressional Record, January 30, 2013. http://www.gpo.gov/ fdsys/
pkg/CREC-2013-01-30/pdf/CREC-2013-01-30-pt1-PgS391.pdf.
Human Rights Watch. “China’s Arms Sales to Sudan.” Issue brief. March 
13, 2008. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/
pdf/080311-cah-arms-sales-fact-sheet.pdf.
International Energy Agency. “Japan.” Report, “Oil & Gas Security: 
Emergence Response of IEA Countries.” 2013. http://www.iea.org/
publications/freepublications/publication/oil-and-gas-emergency-
policy---japan-2013-update.html.
Jones, G. Gareth. “The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-
1924: The Search for an Oil Policy.” The Historical Journal 20: 3 
(September 1977): pp. 647-72. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638433.
Kaminski, Matthew. “Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal: An Ally Frets About 
American Retreat.” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2013. http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230433740457921174282
0387758.
Kamrava, Mehran. Qatar: Small State, Big Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2013.
Kane, Tim. Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003. Washington, D.C.: 
Heritage Foundation, 2004. http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003.
Kemp, Geoffrey. The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing 
Presence in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2010. http://goo.gl/d9JyPX.
Kent, Marian. Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-
1920. London: Macmillan, 1976.
Korosec, Kristen. “Fuelish Dreams: Every President Tries to Break U.S. Oil 
Addiction; Every President Fails.” CBS. April 4, 2011. http://www.
cbsnews.com/media/fuelish-dreams-every-president-tries-to-break-
us-oil-addiction-every-president-fails/.
Kuwait News Agency. “South Korea’s Oil Dependence on Middle 
East Down.” September 29, 2009. http://www.kuna.net.kw/
ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=2028099&language=en.
Lacey, Stephen. “Should You Believe Claims About the Coming End 
of Fracking?” Greentech Media, October 1, 2014. http://www.
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/no-the-end-of-fracking-is-not-
near.
Laessing, Ulf. “Saudi King Back Home, Orders $37 Billion In 
Handouts.” Reuters, February 23, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/02/23/us-saudi-king-idUSTRE71M22V20110223.
Lee, Heesu. “Shale Boom Redraws Oil Routs As Alaskans Ship to Korea.” 
Bloomberg, October 30, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-10-30/shale-boom-redraws-oil-routes-as-alaskans-ship-
to-korea.html.
Levi, Michael. “Think Again: The American Energy Boom.” Foreign Policy, 
June 18, 2012. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/think-again-the-
americanenergy-boom/.
Little, Douglas. “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action 
in the Middle East.” Diplomatic History 28, no. 5 (2004).
Loder, Asjylyn. “U.S. Shale-Oil Boom May Not Last as Fracking Wells Lack 
Staying Power.” Bloomberg Businessweek, October 10, 2013. http://
www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-10/u-dot-s-dot-shale-oil-
boom-may-not-last-as-fracking-wells-lack-staying-power.
Long, Justin. “Why the Middle East Still Doesn’t Matter.” Politico Magazine, 
October 9, 2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/
why-the-middle-east-still-doesnt-matter-111747.html. 
Luft, Gal. “Dependence on Middle East Energy and its Impact on Global 
Security.” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. N.d. Accessed 
April 2, 2015. http://www.iags.org/luft_dependence_on_middle_
east_energy.pdf.
Mathias, Peter. The First Industrial Nation: The Economic History of Britain 
1700-1914. London: Routledge, 2001.
Medlock, Kenneth B., Amy Myers Jaffe, and Peter R. Hartley. Shale Gas 
and U.S. National Security. Houston: Baker Institute, 2011. www.
bakerinstitute.org/files/496/.
Michaels, Jeffrey H. “Dysfunctional Doctrines? Eisenhower, Carter, and U.S. 
Military Intervention in the Middle East.” Political Science Quarterly 
126:3 (2011).
Mitchell, John V. “Asia’s New Role in Global Energy Security.” In Energy 
Security and the Asia Pacific Course Reader, ed. Mikkal E. Herberg. 
Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014. http://www.nbr.org/
publications/anthologies/Energy_Course_Reader/EnergySecurity_
Mitchell_chapter2.pdf.
Montgomery, Bruce P. “Congressional Oversight: Vice President Richard 
Cheney’s Executive Branch Triumph.” Political Science Quarterly 
120:4 (Winter 2005/2006).
139
the shale revolution and american involvement in the middle east
Morse, Edward L. “Welcome to the Revolution: Why Shale is the Next Shale.” 
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/141202/edward-l-morse/welcome-to-the-revolution.
Nasr, Vali. “The U.S. Should Focus on Asia: All of Asia.” Brookings 
Institution. April 11, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/
opinions/2013/04/11-us-asia-nasr.
Njolstad, Olav. “The Collapse of Superpower Détente, 1975-1980.” In Westad 
and Leffler, eds., Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume III. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Obama, Barack. “State of the Union Address.” Speech. Washington, D.C. 
January 28, 2014. White House Office of the Press Secretary. http://
www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-
obamas-state-union-address.
Odom, William E. “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command.” 
Journal of Cold War Studies 8:2 (Spring 2006).
Pallone, Frank Jr. Speech on Oil Dependence in the Middle East, 113th 
Congress, 1st session. Congressional Record, May 13, 2009. https://
www. congress.gov/crec/2009/05/13/CREC-2009-05-13-pt1-
PgH5492-3.pdf.
Parkinson, Roger. The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the 
Origins of the First World War. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008.
Parrish, Karen. “Hagel Outlines U.S. Posture, Way Ahead in Middle East.” 
American Forces Press Service, December 7, 2013. http://www.defense.
gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121299.
Piven, Ben. “Map: US Bases Encircle Iran.” Al Jazeera, 
May 1, 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
interactive/2012/04/2012417131242767298.html.
Pollack, Kenneth M., and Ray Takeyh. “Near Eastern Promises.” 
Foreign Affairs (May/June 2014). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/141213/kenneth-m-pollack-and-ray-takeyh/near-eastern-
promises.
Posen, Barry R. “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy.” 
Foreign Affairs (January/February 2013). http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/138466/barry-r-posen/pull-back.
Randall, Stephen J. United States Foreign Oil Policy Since World War I: For 
Profits and Security. 2nd ed. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2005.
Reagan, Ronald. “National Security Strategy of the United States.” The White 
House. January 1987. http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=48.
“Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group.” Washington, 
D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, May 2001. http://web.ornl.
gov/sci/propulsionmaterials/pdfs/National-Energy-Policy-2001.pdf.
Rosenberg, Elizabeth. “Energy Rush: Shale Production and U.S. National 
Security.” Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, 
2014. http://www.cnas.org/energy-rush#.VIG0F4ej7Zg.
Rovner, Joshua, and Caitlin Talmadge. “Hegemony, Force Posture, and the 
Provision of Public Goods: The Once and Future Role of Outside 
Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil.” Security Studies 23:3 (August 
2014). http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15325024.2014
.935224.
Russell, James A. “Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling 
Case of Today’s Middle East.” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2007. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB814.
pdf.
Sage, Christopher S. “The Myth of U.S. Energy Independence.” Master’s 
thesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2014. http://projects.
iq.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/sage_0.pdf.
Said, Summer. “Shale’s Threat to Middle East Has Big Consequences, Says 
“Frack Master.” Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2013. http://blogs.
wsj.com/middleeast/2013/12/10/shales-threat-to-middle-east-has-
big-consequences-says-frack-master/.
Sands, Gary. “China and the ISIS Threat.” The Diplomat, September 26, 2014. 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-and-the-isis-threat/.
Sanger, David E. “Commitments on Three Fronts Test Obama’s Foreign 
Policy.” The New York Times, September 3, 2014. http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/09/04/world/europe/commitments-on-3-fronts-test-
obamas-foreign-policy-doctrine.html.
Schneller Jr., Robert J. Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S. Naval Forces 
Central Command/Fifth Fleet. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical 
Center, 2007.
Schurman, D.M. The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval 
Strategic Thought, 1867-1914. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1965.
Schurman, Donald M. “Mahan Revisted.” In John B. Hattendorf and Robert 
S. Jordan, eds., Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain 
and America in the Twentieth Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1989.
“Shale Oil: In a Bind.” The Economist, December 6, 2014. http://www.
economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21635505-will-falling-
oil-prices-curb-americas-shale-boom-bind.
Singer, Clifford. Energy and International War: From Babylon to Baghdad and 
Beyond. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2008.
Solana, Javier. “America’s Perilous Pivot.” Oxford Energy Forum, no. 91. 
February 2013. http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/OEF-91.pdf.
Stokesbury, James L. Navy and Empire. New York: William Morrow and 
Company, 1983.
Stratfor Global Intelligence. “Strategic Reversal: The United States, Iran, 
and the Middle East.” November 24, 2014. http://www.stratfor.com/
analysis/strategic-reversal-united-states-iran-and-middle-east.
Thompson, Loren. “What Happens When America No Longer Needs Middle 
East Oil?” Forbes, December 2, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/
lorenthompson/ 2012/12/03/what-happens-when-america-no-
longer-needs-middle-east-oil/.
Toichi, Tsutomu. “Japan’s Response to Its New Energy Security Challenges.” 
In Adapting to a New Energy Era, series 46. Seattle: National 
Bureau of Asian Research, 2014. http://www.nbr.org/publications/
specialreport/pdf/Free/113014/SR46.pdf, 31.
Torchia, Andrew. “Gulf Economies Edge Towards Reform as Oil 
Price Slides.” Reuters, November 2, 2014. http://www.
reuters.com/ article/2014/11/02/mideast-subsidies-reform-
idUSL6N0SA1BE20141102.
Tuttle, Robert and Anna Shiryaevskaya. “Qatar to Boost Europe LNG Sales 
as Gas Trades at 7-Year High.” Bloomberg, December 23, 2013. http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-23/qatar-to-boost-european-
lng-sales-as-gas-trades-at-7-year-high.html.
United Nations Security Council. “Security Council Adopts Resolution 2170 
(2014) Condemning Gross, Widespread Abuse of Human Right by 
Extremist Groups in Iraq, Syria.” News release. August 15, 2014. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11520.doc.htm.
U.S. Defense Department. “Draft Defense Planning Guidance for FY 1994-
99.” 1992. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/doc03_
extract_nytedit.pdf.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. “U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas 
Proved Reserves.” December 4, 2014. http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/
crudeoilreserves.
------. “Countries: Oil Consumption.” 2012. http://www.eia.gov/countries/
index.cfm?view=consumption.
------. “Crude Oil Imports From Persian Gulf.” February 27, 2015. http://
www.eia.gov/petroleum/imports/companylevel/summary.cfm
------. “How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced When Different Fuels Are 
Burned?” N.d. Accessed December 5, 2014. http://www.eia.gov/tools/
faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11.
------. “How Much Oil Consumed by the United States Comes from Foreign 
Sources.” March 12, 2015. http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.
cfm?id=32&t=6.
------. “International Energy Statistics.” N.d. Accessed December 5, 
2014. http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.
cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1.
------. “Strait of Hormuz Is Chokepoint for 20percent of World’s Oil.” 
September 5, 2012. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
cfm?id=7830.
------. “U.S. Imports of Crude Oil.” March 30, 2015. http://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRIMUS1&f=A.
------. “World Crude Oil Production: Persian Gulf Nations, non-OPEC, and 
World.” March 2015. http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/
pdf/sec11_5.pdf.
U.S. Navy. “About U.S. Naval Forces, U.S. 5th Fleet.” Naval Forces U.S. Central 
Command. N.d. Accessed December 4, 2014. http://www.cusnc.navy.
mil/about.html.
------. “Naval Support Activity Bahrain.” Commander, Naval Installations 
Command. N.d. Accessed December 4, 2014. http://www.cnic.navy.
140
columbia university journal of politics & society
mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/nsa_bahrain.html
------. “Status of the Navy.” N.d. Accessed December 4, 2014. http://www.
navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146.
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. “Senators Urge 
Majority Leader to Allow Floor Vote on Keystone XL.” News release. 
Republican News, June 24, 2014. http://www.energy.senate.gov/
public/index. cfm/2014/6/senators-urge-majority-leader-to-allow-
floor-vote-on-keystone-xl.
U.S. State Department. “Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief 
Chronology.” Office of the Historian. N.d. Accessed December 4, 
2014. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm.
“U.S. Sells $11bn worth of Arms to Qatar.” RT, July 15, 2014. http://rt.com/
news/172804-us-qatar-apache-deal/.
“U.S. Troop Deployments by Region and Decade,” Heritage Foundation, 
chart, http://www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/97404E448DAA6
4B0B5F463E961E208A7.gif.
Vidal, John. “The End of Oil Is Closer Than You Think.” The Guardian, 
April 21, 2005. http://www.theguardian.com/science/2005/apr/21/
oilandpetrol.news.
Wald, Charles F., et al. “Energy Security: America’s Best Defense.” Deloitte. 
N.d. Accessed October 30, 2014. http://www.deloitte.com/assets/
Dcom-UnitedStates/Localpercent20Assets/Documents/AD/us_ad_
EnergySecurity052010.pdf.
Walt, Stephen M. “Do No (More) Harm.” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2014. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/07/do-no-more-harm/.
Westphal, Kristen, Marco Overhaus, and Guido Steinberg. “The U.S. Shale 
Revolution and the Arab Gulf States.” Report no. 11. Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft Und Politik German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs, 2014. http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/
contents/products/research_papers/2014_RP11_wep_ovs_sbg.pdf.
“Winners and Losers.” The Economist, October 25, 2014. http://www.
economist.com/news/international/21627642-america-and-its-
friends-benefit-falling-oil-prices-its-most-strident-critics.
Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power. New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1991.
------. The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World. 
New York: Penguin, 2011.
Zhang, Xunchao. “A U.S.-China War in Asia: Could America Win by 




1. Condoleezza Rice, quoted in Gal Luft, “Dependence on Middle East 
Energy and its Impact on Global Security,” Institute for the Analysis 
of Global Security, n.d., accessed April 2, 2015, http://www.iags.org/
luft_dependence_on_middle_east_energy.pdf.
2. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Imports of Crude 
Oil,” March 30, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.
ashx?n=PET&s=MCRIMUS1&f=A.
3. Kristen Korosec, “Fuelish Dreams: Every President Tries to Break 
U.S. Oil Addiction; Every President Fails,” CBS, April 4, 2011, http://
www.cbsnews.com/media/fuelish-dreams-every-president-tries-to-
break-us-oil-addiction-every-president-fails/.
4. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Crude Oil 
Production: Persian Gulf Nations, non-OPEC, and World,” March 
2015, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec11_5.pdf.
5. Barry R. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign 
Policy,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2013), http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/138466/barry-r-posen/pull-back.
6. Dennis Blair, and Michael Hagee, “Oil Security 2025:U.S. National 
Security Policy in an Era of Domestic Oil Abundance,” Securing 
America’s Future Energy, 2014.
7. Edward L. Morse, “Welcome to the Revolution: Why Shale is the Next 
Shale,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/141202/edward-l-morse/welcome-to-the-revolution.
8. Thomas L. Friedman, “Win, Win, Win, Win, Win,” New York 
Times, December 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/
opinion/28friedman.html.
9. Robert D. Blackwill and Meghan O’Sullivan, “America’s Energy 
Edge: The Geopolitical Consequences of the Shale Revolution,” 
Foreign Affairs (March/April 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/140750/robert-d-blackwill-and-meghan-l-osullivan/
americas-energy-edge.
10. Morse, “Why Shale is the Next Shale.”
11. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Crude Oil Imports From 
Persian Gulf,” February 27, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/
imports/companylevel/summary.cfm; U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, “How much oil consumed by the United States 
comes from foreign sources,” March 12, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/
tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=32&t=6.
12. Elizabeth Rosenberg, “Energy Rush: Shale Production and U.S. 
National Security” (Washington, D.C.: Center for New American 
Security, 2014), p. 11.
13. Kenneth B. Medlock, Amy Myers Jaffe, and Peter R. Hartley, Shale 
Gas and U.S. National Security (Houston: Baker Institute, 2011), 
www.bakerinstitute.org/files/496/, 12; Chevron, “Natural Gas 
from Shale,” July 2014, http://www.chevron.com/deliveringenergy/
naturalgas/shalegas/.
14. Medlock, Jaffe, and Hartley, Shale Gas and U.S. National Security, p. 
12.
15. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Crude Oil and 
Natural Gas Proved Reserves,” December 4, 2014, http://www.eia.
gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves.
16. Ibid.
17. Asjylyn Loder, “U.S. Shale-Oil Boom May Not Last as Fracking Wells 
Lack Staying Power,” Bloomberg Businessweek, October 10, 2013, 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-10/u-dot-s-dot-
shale-oil-boom-may-not-last-as-fracking-wells-lack-staying-power.
18. Tom Zeller Jr., “Is the U.S. Shale Boom Going Bust?,” BloombergView, 
April 22, 2014, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-22/
is-the-u-s-shale-boom-going-bust.
19. Morse, “Why Shale Is the Next Shale.”
20. “Shale Oil: In a Bind,” The Economist, December 6, 2014, http://www.
economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21635505-will-falling-
oil-prices-curb-americas-shale-boom-bind.
21. “Breakeven Oil Prices for U.S. Shale: Analysts Estimates,” Reuters, 
October 23, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/
idUSL3N0SH5N220141023.
22. Brian O’Keefe, “How oil’s dramatic plunge has changed the 
energy equation,” Fortune, February 18, 2015, http://fortune.
com/2015/02/18/oils-new-math/
23. Giles Parkinson, “The Rise and Fall of the US Shale Oil 
Industry,” CleanTechnica, February 5, 2015, http://cleantechnica.
com/2015/02/05/rise-fall-us-shale-oil-industry-graph/
24. O’Keefe, “How oil’s dramatic plunge has changed the energy 
equation”
25. Ibid.
26. Accenture, “Accenture Reports Unconventional Oil and Gas 
Operators Can Reduce Costs through Better Managing Above-




27. Mark P. Mills, “The Oil Price Swoon Won’t Stop the Shale Boom,” 
The Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/mark-p-mills-the-oil-price-swoon-wont-stop-the-shale-
boom-1414106473
28. Morse, “Why Shale Is the Next Shale.”
29. Jennifer Cusack, “The Persian Gulf War--the Student Front,” Los 
Angeles Times, January 27, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-
27/opinion/op-143_1_gulf-war.
30. Toby C. Jones, “America, Oil, and War in the Middle East,” Journal of 
American History (2012) 99 (1): 208-218, http://jah.oxfordjournals.
org/content/99/1/208.full.
31. Michael T. Klare, “Oil Wars Transforming the American Military into 
a Global Oil-Protection Service,” TomDispatch.com, October 7, 2004, 
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/1888/.
32. Jennifer Cusack, “The Persian Gulf War: The Student Front,” Los 
Angeles Times, January 27, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-
27/opinion/op-143_1_gulf-war.
33. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 549.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid, p. 564.
36. Ibid, pp. 547-48.
37. Robert J. Schneller Jr., Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S. Naval 
141
the shale revolution and american involvement in the middle east
Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet (Washington, D.C.: Naval 
Historical Center, 2007), p. 7.
38. Sami G. Hajjar, “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and 
Prospects,” U.S. Strategic Studies Institute, March 2002, http://www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub185.pdf, p. 8.
39. Stephen J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy Since World 
War I: For Profits and Security, 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005), p. 287.
40. Yergin, The Prize, pp. 584-90.
41. Ibid, p. 599.
42. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy Since World War I, 290.
43. William E. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central 
Command,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 57.
44. Ibid., p. 52.
45. Ibid., pp. 69-74.
46. Hajjar, “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf,” 17; Schneller, Anchor of 
Resolve, p. 7.
47. Ibid., p. 9.
48. Jeffrey H. Michaels, “Dysfunctional Doctrines? Eisenhower, Carter, 
and U.S. Military Intervention in the Middle East,” Political Science 
Quarterly 126, no. 3 (2011), p. 483.
49. Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address,” (speech, Washington, 
D.C., January 23, 1980), Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/
president/carter/es/speech-3404.
50. Michaels, “Dysfunctional Doctrines,” pp. 483-84.
51. Olav Njolstad, “The Collapse of Superpower Détente, 1975-1980,” in 
Westad and Leffler, eds., Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 
III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 689.
52. Keith Crane et al., Imported Oil and U.S. National Security (Arlington, 
VA: RAND, 2009), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monographs/2009/RAND_MG838.pdf, p. 61.
53. Blackwill and O’Sullivan, “America’s Energy Edge.”
54. Coral Bell, “From Carter to Reagan,” Foreign Affairs 63:3 (1984): p. 
499.
55. Hajjar, “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf,” p. 8.
56. Douglas Little, “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert 
Action in the Middle East,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 5 (2004), p. 
689.
57. Schneller, Anchor of Resolve, p. 13. 
58. Ibid, pp. 12-19.
59. Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the 
Modern World (New York: Penguin, 2011), pp. 10-11.
60. George H.W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” 
(speech, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1990), Miller Center, 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3425.
61. Hajjar, “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf,” p. v.
62. “U.S. Troop Deployments by Region and Decade,” Heritage 
Foundation, chart, http://www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/9740
4E448DAA64B0B5F463E961E208A7.gif.
63. Hajjar, “U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf,” p. 26.
64. Ronald Reagan, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” The 
White House, January 1987, http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=48.
65. Crane et al., Imported Oil and U.S. National Security, p. 61.
66. George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” 
The White House, 1991, http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=52.
67. U.S. Defense Department, “Draft Defense Planning Guidance for FY 
1994-99,” 1992, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb245/
doc03_extract_nytedit.pdf.
68. “Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group” 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, May 2001), 
http://web.ornl.gov/sci/propulsionmaterials/pdfs/National-Energy-
Policy-2001.pdf.
69. George W. Bush, “Energy Policy,” (speech, St. Paul, MN, May 17, 
2001), Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext051701.html.
70. George W. Bush, “2007 State of the Union Address” (speech, 
Washington, D.C., January 23, 2007), http://www.americanrhetoric.
com/speeches/stateoftheunion2007.html.
71. Charles F. Wald et al, “Energy Security: America’s Best Defense,” 
Deloitte Development, N.d., Accessed October 30, 2014, http://
www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Localpercent20Assets/
Documents/AD/us_ad_EnergySecurity052010.pdf, p. 9.
72. John Vidal, “The End of Oil Is Closer Than You Think,” The 
Guardian, April 21, 2005, http://www.theguardian.com/science/2005/
apr/21/oilandpetrol.news.
73. U.S. State Department, “Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A 
Brief Chronology,” n.d., Office of the Historian, accessed 4 Dec 2014, 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm.
74. Tim Kane, Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003 (Washington, 
D.C.: Heritage Foundation, October 27, 2004), http://www.
heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-
deployment-1950-2003; Karen Parrish, “Hagel Outlines U.S. Posture, 
Way Ahead in Middle East,” American Forces Press Service, December 
7, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121299.
75. Yergin, The Prize, p. 189.
76. Peter Feaver, “American Grand Strategy at the Crossroads: Leading 
from the Front, Leading from Behind, or Not Leading at All,” 
in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, eds., America’s Path: 
Grand Strategy and the Next Administration, CNAS Report (May 
2012), http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_
AmericasPath_FontaineAndLord.pdf; Stephen G. Brooks, G. John 
Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Lean Forward: in Defense of 
American Engagement,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2013), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-
john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward.
77. Ibid, pp. 135-42.
78. Yergin, pp. 155-156.
79. Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 
1900-1920 (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 17, p. 94, p. 108.
80. Ibid, pp. 9-14, p. 156.
81. Ibid, p. 6.
82. Ibid, pp. 119-20.
83. R.W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, Vol. 1: 
The Developing Years 1901-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), p. 242. 
84. Kent, Oil and Empire, p. 14.
85. Ibid, p. 126.
86. Yergin, The Prize, pp. 188-90; G. Gareth Jones, “The British 
Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search for an 
Oil Policy,” The Historical Journal 20:3 (September 1977): pp. 669-72; 
Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, pp. 256-271; 
Kent, Oil and Empire, p. 157.
87. “Strategic Reversal: The United States, Iran, and the Middle East,” 
Stratfor Global Intelligence, November 24, 2014, http://www.stratfor.
com/analysis/strategic-reversal-united-states-iran-and-middle-east.
88. Pollack and Takeyh, “Near Eastern Promises.”
89. Westphal et al., “The US Shale Revolution and the Arab Gulf States.”
90. Ibid.
91. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Strait of Hormuz is 
Chokepoint for 20 percent of World’s Oil,” September 5, 2012, http://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7830.
92. Schneller, Anchor of Resolve, p. 7.
93. Xunchao Zhang, “A U.S.-China War in Asia: Could America Win 
by Blockade,” The National Interest, November 25, 2014, http://
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/us-china-war-asia-could-america-
win-by-blockade-11733.
94. U.S. Navy, “About U.S. Naval Forces, U.S. 5th Fleet,” Naval Forces U.S. 
Central Command, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/about.html.
95. U.S. Navy, “Status of the Navy,” December 4, 2014, http://www.navy.
mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146; U.S. Navy, “Naval Support 
Activity Bahrain,” Commander, Naval Installations Command, 
http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/
nsa_bahrain.html; Ben Piven, “Map: US Bases Encircle Iran,” 
Al Jazeera, May 1, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
interactive/2012/04/2012417131242767298.html.
96. “379th Air Expeditionary Wing,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/379aew.htm; “US Sells 
$11bn worth of Arms to Qatar,” RT, July 15, 2014, http://rt.com/
news/172804-us-qatar-apache-deal/.
97. “379th Air Expeditionary Wing,” GlobalSecurity.org.
98. Boeing, “KC-135,” http://www.boeing.com/boeing/history/boeing/
kc135.page.
99. Parrish, “Hagel Outlines U.S. Posture, Way Ahead in Middle East.”
100. Raad Alkadiri and J. Robinson West, “Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf 
Region,” edited by Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn in Energy 
and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013), p. 232.
101. Kate Gordon, “How the U.S. Oil Boom Will Change the Markets and 
Geopolitics,” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2013, http://online.wsj.
com/articles/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084.
102. Rosenberg, “Energy Rush: Shale Production and U.S. National 
Security,” p. 13.
142
columbia university journal of politics & society
103. Michael Levi, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom,” Foreign 
Policy, June 18, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/think-
again-the-americanenergy-boom/.
104. Carolyn Barnett, “The New Energy Revolution and the Gulf ” 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
November 2014).
105. Blackwill and O’Sullivan, “America’s Energy Edge.”
106. Barnett, “The New Energy Revolution and the Gulf,” p. 4.
107. Ibid, p. 2.
108. Blackwill and O’Sullivan, “America’s Energy Edge.”
109. Morse, “Why Shale is the Next Shale.”
110. Asa Fitch, “Oil Price Slide May Curb Gulf States’ Spending 
Plans,” Wall Street Journal, November 23, 2014, http://online.
wsj.com/articles/oil-price-slide-may-curb-gulf-states-spending-
plans-1416792930.
111. Andrew Torchia, “Gulf economies edge towards reform as 
oil price slides,” Reuters, November 2, 2014, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/11/02/mideast-subsidies-reform-
idUSL6N0SA1BE20141102.
112. Ulf Laessing, “Saudi King back home, orders $37 billion in 
handouts,” Reuters, February 23, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/02/23/us-saudi-king-idUSTRE71M22V20110223.
113. “Winners and Losers,” The Economist, October 25, 2014, http://www.
economist.com/news/international/21627642-america-and-its-
friends-benefit-falling-oil-prices-its-most-strident-critics.
114. Torchia, “Gulf economies edge towards reform as oil price slides.”
115. Ibid.
116. “Winners and Losers,” The Economist
117. Morse, “Why Shale is the Next Shale.”
118. Barnett, “The New Energy Revolution and the Gulf,” p. 8.
119. Ibid.
120. Ray Tayekh and Kenneth Pollack, “Near Eastern Promises: Why 
Washington Should Focus on the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs (May/
June 2014). 
121. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy.”
122. Kristen Westphal, Marco Overhaus, and Guido Steinberg, “The US 
Shale Revolution and the Arab Gulf States,” Report no. 11. (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs, 2014), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/
contents/products/research_papers/2014_RP11_wep_ovs_sbg.pdf.
123. International Energy Agency, “Oil & Gas Security: Emergence 
Response of IEA Countries” (2013), http://www.iea.org/publications/
freepublications/publication/oil-and-gas-emergency-policy---japan-
2013-update.html, p. 3.
124. Tsutomu Toichi, “Japan’s Response to Its New Energy Security 
Challenges,” in Adapting to a New Energy Era, series 46 (Seattle: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), http://www.nbr.org/
publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/113014/SR46.pdf, p. 31.
125. Kuwait News Agency, “South Korea’s Oil Dependence on Middle 
East Down,” September 29, 2009, http://www.kuna.net.kw/
ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=2028099&language=en.
126. Heesu Lee, “Shale Boom Redraws Oil Routs As Alaskans Ship to 
Korea,” Bloomberg, October 30, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-10-30/shale-boom-redraws-oil-routes-as-alaskans-ship-
to-korea.html.
127. Uk Heo, Terence Roehrig, and Jungmin Seo, Korean Security in a 
Changing East Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 
2007), p. 147.
128. Geoffrey Kemp, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s 
Growing Presence in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), p. 4.
129. Nick Cunningham, “The Geopolitical Implications of U.S. Natural 
Gas Exports,” American Security Project, March 5, 2013, http://www.
americansecurityproject.org/the-geopolitical-implications-of-u-s-
natural-gas-exports/; Deloitte, “Who Goes There? Friend or Foe: Gas, 
Russia and the Middle East,” Fall 2013, http://www2.deloitte.com/be/
en/pages/energy-and-resources/articles/who-goes-there-friend-or-
foe.html.
130. Robert Tuttle and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Qatar to Boost Europe 
LNG Sales as Gas Trades at 7-Year High,” Bloomberg, December 23, 
2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-23/qatar-to-boost-
european-lng-sales-as-gas-trades-at-7-year-high.html.
131. “Gas Pricing in Europe: Careful What You Wish For,” The Economist, 
July 14, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21558433.
132. “Gazprom and European Gas Markets: Paying the Piper,” The 
Economist, January 4, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/
business/21592639-european-efforts-reduce-russian-state-owned-
companys-sway-over-gas-prices-have-been.
133. Jason Bordoff and Trevor Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue?,” 
Center on Global Energy Policy (New York: Columbia University, 
September 22, 2014), http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/on-the-
record/new-report-american-gas-rescue.
134. Osman Antwi-Boateng, “The Rise of Qatar as a Soft Power,” European 
Scientific Journal (December 2013), http://eujournal.org/index.php/
esj/article/viewFile/2337/2210.
135. Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2013), p. 89.
136. Farhad Darvishi and Ameneh Jalilvand, “Impacts of U.S. Military 
Presence in the Arabic Countries of Persian Gulf,” Geopolitics 
Quarterly 6:4 (Winter 2010): pp. 167-80.
137. Ibid., p. 175.
138. Javier Solana, “America’s Perilous Pivot,” Oxford Energy Forum 91 
(February 2013), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/
uploads/2013/05/OEF_-91.pdf.
139. Matt Bradley and Brian Spegele, “Middle East Fuels Fresh China-
U.S. Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2013, http://online.
wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873247551045790732839485177
14; Dingding Chen, “China Should Send Troops to Fight ISIS,” The 
Diplomat, September 12, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/
china-should-send-troops-to-fight-isis/.
140. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Countries: Oil 
Consumption,” 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.
cfm?view=consumption. 
141. United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Adopts 
Resolution 2170 (2014) Condemning Gross, Widespread Abuse of 
Human Right by Extremist Groups in Iraq, Syria,” News release, 
August 15, 2014, http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11520.doc.htm; 
Gary Sands, “China and the ISIS Threat,” The Diplomat, September 
26, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-and-the-isis-threat/.
142. Vali Nasr, “The U.S. Should Focus on Asia: All of Asia,” Brookings 
Institute, April 11, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/
opinions/2013/04/11-us-asia-nasr.
143. Mikkal E. Herberg, “The Rise of Energy and Resource Nationalism 
in Asia,” in Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose, ed. 
Ashley J. Tellis, Andrew Marble, and Travis Tanner (Seattle: National 
Bureau of Asian Research, 2010), p. 124.
144. Matthew Kaminski, “Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal: An Ally Frets About 
American Retreat,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304337404579211742820
387758.
145. Tim Arango and Clifford Krauss, “China Is Reaping Biggest Benefits 
of Iraq Oil Boom,” The New York Times, June 2, 2013, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/06/03/world/middleeast/china-reaps-biggest-
benefits-of-iraq-oil-boom.html.
146. John V. Mitchell, “Asia’s New Role in Global Energy Security,” in 
Energy Security and the Asia Pacific Course Reader, ed. Mikkal E. 
Herberg (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), http://
www.nbr.org/publications/anthologies/Energy_Course_Reader/
EnergySecurity_Mitchell_chapter2.pdf, p. 47.
147. Herberg, “The Rise of Energy and Resource Nationalism in Asia,” p. 
124.
148. Christopher S. Sage, “The Myth of U.S. Energy Independence,” 
(Master’s thesis, Harvard University, 2014), http://projects.iq.harvard.
edu/files/fellows/files/sage_0.pdf, p. 17.
149. Monica Herbst, “Oil for China, Guns for Darfur,” Bloomberg 
Businessweek, March 14, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/
stories/2008-03-14/oil-for-china-guns-for-darfurbusinessweek-
business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
150. Human Rights Watch, “China’s Arms Sales to Sudan,” Issue brief, 
March 13, 2008, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdf/080311-cah-arms-sales-fact-sheet.pdf.
151. Ibid.; Hilary Andersson, “China ‘is Fueling the War in Darfur,’” BBC, 
July 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7503428.stm.
152. Mitchell, “Asia’s New Role in Global Energy Security,” p. 34.
